Game Theory: A Critical Introduction

Hargreaves-Heap, Shaun; Varoufakis, Yanis

ISBN 10: 0415250943 / ISBN 13: 9780415250948

Editore: Routledge, 2004

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Titolo: Game Theory: A Critical Introduction

Casa editrice: Routledge

Data di pubblicazione: 2004

Legatura: Rilegato

Condizione: New

Edizione: seconda edizione

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Riassunto:

In recent years game theory has swept through all of the social sciences. Its practitioners have great designs for it, claiming that it offers an opportunity to unify the social sciences and that it it the natural foundation of a rational theory of society. Game Theory is for those who are intrigued but baffled by these claims, and daunted by the technical demands of most introductions to the subject.

Requiring no more than simple arithmetic, the book:
* Traces the origins of Game Theory and its philosophical premises

* Looks at its implications for the theory of bargaining and social contract theory

* Gives a detailed exposition of all of the major `games' including the famous `prisoner's dilemma'

* Analyses cooperative, non cooperative, repeated, evolutionary and experimental games

Product Description:

Game theory now provides the theoretical underpinning for most areas of economics. Moreover, it has spread fast in other disciplines, energised by claims that it represents an opportunity to unify the social sciences, to found a rational theory of society on a common bedrock of methodological individualism. The speed of these developments has been remarkable and they have constituted something of a revolution. But the technical demands of the subject often discourage the readers most likely to benefit from engaging with it. This second edition of Shaun Hargreaves-Heap and Yanis Varoufakis's classic text strips away the mystique and lets the reader make up his or her own mind. It combines the thoroughness of a textbook with the critical edge of the first edition as it: explains clearly all the major concepts (e.g. the various forms of Nash's equilibrium, bargaining solutions), as well as their philosophical bearings (e.g. rationality, knowledge, social agency); introduces new, exciting areas of research (e.g. psychological, experimental and evolutionary game theory), which it blends carefully with traditional games (e.g. the prisoner's dilemma, hawk-dove); offers many problems at the end of each chapter, complete with extensive solutions. With an uncompromising commitment to intellectual honesty, it seeks out game theory's strengths and limitations in a bid to draw out the implications of both for any theory of society which relies exclusively on liberal individualism. A new generation of students of game theory will grow to appreciate this superb text whilst fans of the first edition will eagerly devour this long-awaited update.