George W Bush Administration Propaganda for an Invasion of Iraq

Larry Hartenian

ISBN 10: 036755884X / ISBN 13: 9780367558840

Editore: Routledge Apr 2021, 2021

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This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Hartenian's history of George W Bush propaganda for an invasion of Iraq returns the administration's approach to its conceptual origins. Hartenian places 'evidence' in the center of his analysis, showing that Rumsfeld's 'the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence' meant that no evidence was necessary to justify an invasion. The 9/11 attacks, indeed, 'changed everything' for the Bush administration and in its aftermath the time for regime change in Iraq had simply come. With no good evidence to support its fears, the administration was certain of apost-9/11-conceived Iraq-al Qaeda 'nexus,' just as with no evidence except the 'absence of evidence' it was certain of Iraqi mastery of 'denial and deception' that hid 'Saddam's' 'evil' activities. Resting on Cheney's 'one percent doctrine,' administration 'certainty' of the threat from Iraq required a US invasion.The policy offices of Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, with the help of George Tenet at CIA, would generate a case of such fright and enormity-the 'mushroom cloud'-that required administration action. Manipulating intelligence and ignoring the growing body of evidence undermining its case, the Bush administration invaded Iraq to bring about 'regime change.' 442 pp. Englisch.

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• Titolo: George W Bush Administration Propaganda for an Invasion of Iraq
• Editore: Routledge Apr 2021
• Data di pubblicazione: 2021
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 036755884X
• ISBN 13: 9780367558840
• Rilegatura: Buch
• Condizione: Neu
• Dimensioni: 235 L x 157 A x 28 P (millimetri) 235 millimetri di larghezza per 157 millimetri di altezza per 28 millimetri di profondità
• Peso: 787 grammi

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

Hartenian’s history of George W Bush propaganda for an invasion of Iraq returns the administration’s approach to its conceptual origins. Hartenian places "evidence" in the center of his analysis, showing that Rumsfeld’s "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" meant that no evidence was necessary to justify an invasion. The 9/11 attacks, indeed, "changed everything" for the Bush administration and in its aftermath the time for regime change in Iraq had simply come.

With no good evidence to support its fears, the administration was certain of a post-9/11-conceived Iraq–al Qaeda "nexus," just as with no evidence except the "absence of evidence" it was certain of Iraqi mastery of "denial and deception" that hid "Saddam’s" "evil" activities. Resting on Cheney’s "one percent doctrine," administration "certainty" of the threat from Iraq required a US invasion.

The policy offices of Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, with the help of George Tenet at CIA, would generate a case of such fright and enormity―the "mushroom cloud"―that required administration action. Manipulating intelligence and ignoring the growing body of evidence undermining its case, the Bush administration invaded Iraq to bring about "regime change."

Informazioni sull?autore

Larry Hartenian is Emeritus Professor of Politics and History at Curry College. He has focused in recent years on contemporary history.