Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language (Synthese Library)

Analytical Table of Contents.- I/Intentionality and Intensionality.- 1. The Intentionality of Acts of Consciousness.- 1.1. Intentionality.- 1.2. “Acts” of Consciousness.- 1.3. The Objects of Acts.- 1.4. Direct-Object Acts versus Propositional Acts.- 1.5. Propositional Acts and Intending “About” Something.- 2. Some Main Characteristics of “Intentional Relations”.- 2.1. “Intentional Relations”.- 2.2. The Existence-Independence of Intentional Relations.- 2.3. The Conception-Dependence of Intentional Relations.- 2.4. Conception-Dependence and the Individuation of Intentions.- 2.5. The “Indeterminacy” in Intentions of Transcendent Objects.- 2.6. Definite and Indefinite Intentions.- 3. The Intensionality of Act-Contexts.- 3.1. Intensionality.- 3.2. The Failure of Substitutivity of Identity for Act-Contexts.- 3.3. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 1: Failure of Existence.- 3.4. Failure of Existential Generalization for Act-Contexts, Case 2: Indefiniteness.- 3.5. “De Dicto” and “De Re” Modalities.- 4. Intensionality vis-à-vis Intentionality.- II/Some Classical Approaches to the Problems of Intentionality and Intensionality.- 1. Theories of Intentionality as Theories About the Objects of Intention.- 1.1. The Object-Approach to Intentionality.- 1.2. “Intentional Objects”.- 1.3. Ambiguities in the Notion of “Intentional Object”.- 2. Object-Theories of Intentionality.- 2.1. Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention: An Interpretation of Brentano’s Early Theory.- 2.2. Problems with Mind-Dependent Entities as Objects of Intention.- 2.3. Intentional Objects as “Objects Beyond Being”: Meinong’s Theory of Objects.- 2.4. Intentional Objects as “Fictions”: Brentano’s Later Theory.- 3. Frege’s Approach to Meaning, Reference, and the Problems of Intensionality.- 3.1. Parallels Between Frege’s Semantics of Act-Sentences and the Object- Approach to Intentionality.- 3.2. Frege’s Theory of Meaning and Reference.- 3.3. Meanings as Abstract “Intensional Entities”.- 3.4. Frege’s Semantics for Sentences of Propositional Attitude.- 3.5. Intensional Entities in Intentionality: Objects or Mediators of Intention?.- III/Fundamentals of Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality.- 1. Husserl’s Phenomenological Approach to Intentionality.- 1.1. Husserl’s Conception of Intentionality.- 1.2. Husserlian Phenomenology and Phenomenological Method.- 1.3. Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Intentionality.- 2. “Phenomenological Content”.- 2.1. Act, Content, and Object: Twardowski’s Formulation of the Distinction.- 2.2. Husserl’s Conception of Content in Logical Investigations.- 2.3. Husserl’s Mature Conception of Content: Noesis and Noema.- 2.4. The Structure of an Act’s Noema: its “Sinn” and “Thetic” components.- 2.5. Content, Noesis, and Noema in Review.- 2.6. The Content of Perception: its Sensory (or Hyletic) and Noetic Phases.- 3. Husserl’s Basic Theory: Intention via Sinn.- 3.1. Noematic Sinne as Mediators.- 3.2. The Theory and Its Account of the Peculiarities of Intention.- IV/Husserl’s Theory of Noematic Sinn.- 1. Interpreting Noematic Sinn.- 1.1. Noema as Content and as Meaning.- 1.2. What is the “Intended as Such”?.- 1.3. Sinne versus Meinongian “Incomplete” Objects.- 1.4. Noema versus Essence.- 2. Husserl’s Identification of Linguistic Meaning and Noematic Sinn.- 2.1. Husserl’s Conception of Linguistic Meaning.- 2.2. Husserl on Meaning and Reference.- 2.3. Every Linguistic Meaning is a Noematic Sinn.- 2.4. Every Noematic Sinn is Expressible as a Linguistic Meaning.- 2.5. Qualifications and Extensions of the Expressibility Thesis.- 2.6. Noematic Description.- 2.7. Noemata as a Kind of Propositions (Sätze).- 3. How Is Intention Achieved via Sinn?.- 3.1. Husserl’s Account of the Structure of a Noematic Sinn: the “X” and the “Predicate-Senses”.- 3.2. Some Problems for a “Definite-Description” Model of Intentionality.- 3.3. The Problem of Definite, or De Re, Intentions.- 3.4. The Sinn of Perception as “Demonstrative”.- 3.5. Intentionality and Pragmatics: Contextual Influences on Intention.- V/Husserl’s Notion of Horizon.- 1. Meaning and Possible Experience: The Turn to Husserl’s Notion of Horizon.- 1.1. The “Indeterminacy” in Intentions of Transcendent Objects.- 1.2. Husserl’s Notions of Object-Horizon, Act-Horizon, and Manifold.- 1.3. Horizon-Analysis as a New Method of Phenomenological Analysis.- 2. Husserl’s Conception of Horizon.- 2.1. Early Notions of Object-Horizon: Ideas (1913).- 2.2. The Horizon of Possible Experiences Associated with an Act: Cartesian Meditations (1931).- 2.3. Act-Horizon and Object-Horizon.- 2.4. The Central Role of Perception in Horizon.- 2.5. The Maximal Horizon of an Act: An Act’s Manifold of Associated Possible Acts.- 3. Horizon and Background Beliefs.- 3.1. The “Predelineation” of an Act’s Horizon.- 3.2. Horizon and Fundamental Background Beliefs.- 3.3. Horizon and Concrete Background Beliefs; Background Meaning.- 3.4. Counter-Evidence within an Act’s Horizon.- 4. The Structure of an Act’s Horizon 25.- 4.1. Internal and External Horizon.- 4.2. Temporal Structure in the Horizon.- 4.3. The Horizon’s Breakdown into Verification Chains.- 4.4. Synthesis of Identification Within the Horizon.- 4.5. Summary of Husserl’s Account of Horizon-Structure.- 5. Toward a Generalized Theory of Horizon.- VI/Horizon-Analysis and the Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning.- 1. Horizon-Analysis as Explication of Sinn and Intention.- 1.1. Horizon-Analysis and the Verification Theory of Meaning.- 1.2. Horizon-Analysis and the Carnapian, or Possible-Worlds, Theory of Meaning.- 1.3. Sorting Husserl with the Carnapian.- 1.4. Horizon-Analysis as “Pragmatic” Explication of Intention.- 1.5. Husserl’s Appraisal of Horizon-Analysis Revisited.- 1.6. The Significance of Horizon-Analysis: Beyond Frege to New Horizons.- 2. The Explication of Meaning in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 2.1. Intension and Extension.- 2.2. Intension and Comprehension.- 2.3. Intensions as Functions on Possible Worlds.- 2.4. Intensions as Functions: Explication versus Definition.- 2.5. Two Kinds of Intensional Entities and Their Explication.- 2.6. “Individual Concepts”, or Individual Meanings.- 2.7. Rigid and Individuating Meanings.- 2.8. The Explication of Noematic Sinn in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 2.9. “Pragmatic” Explication of Intention in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 3. The Basis in Husserl for a Possible-Worlds Explication of Meaning and Intention.- 3.1. Possible Objects and Possible Worlds in Husserl.- 3.2. The Equivalence of Horizon-Analysis and Possible-Worlds Explication of Sinn and Intention.- 3.3. The Eliminability of Possible Entities from Husserl’s Theory of Horizon.- VII/Intentionality and Possible-Worlds Semantics.- 1. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Theory.- 1.1. Husserl’s Theory of Intentionality With and Without Possible Worlds.- 1.2. The “Husserlian” Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality.- 1.3. The Pure Possible-Worlds Theory of Intentionality.- 1.4. The Possible-Worlds Approach to Intentionality.- 2. Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.1. Fregean, Tarskian, and Possible-Worlds Semantics.- 2.2. Hintikka’s Possible-Worlds Approach to Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.3. The Account of Intensionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.4. Meaning Entities in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 2.5. Background Beliefs in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 3. Intentionality in Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- 3.1. Object and Content of Belief.- 3.2. The Aboutness of Indefinite, or De Dicto, Belief.- 3.3. The Aboutness of Definite, or De Re, Belief.- 3.4. Existence-Independence and Conception-Dependence of Aboutness.- 3.5. States of Affairs as Objects of Belief.- 4. A Husserlian Possible-Worlds Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.- VIII/Definite, or De Re, Intention in a Husserlian Framework.- 1. The Characterization of Definite, or De Re, Intention.- 1.1. Modes of Definite Intention.- 1.2. Must the Object of a Definite Intention Exist?.- 1.3. Expressing and Describing Definite Intentions: Proper Names, Demonstrative Pronouns, and Quantifying-In.- 1.4. The Explication of Definite Intention in Terms of Horizon and Possible Worlds.- 2. Perceptual Acquaintance.- 2.1. The “Demonstrative” Acquainting Sense in Perception.- 2.2. The Explication of Perceptual Acquaintance in Terms of Possible Worlds.- 3. Identity, Individuation, and Individuation in Consciousness.- 3.1. Concerning Identity and Individuation.- 3.2. The Identity of a Natural Individual and Its “Transcendence”.- 3.3. Husserl on Individuation Through Time.- 3.4. Husserl on Trans-World Individuation.- 4. Toward a Phenomenological Account of Individuative Consciousness.- 4.1. The Phenomenological Structure of Individuative Intention: Toward a “Pragmatic” Analysis of Individuative Definiteness.- 4.2. Knowing-Who and Individuative Consciousness.- 4.3. A Closer Look at the Structure of Individuative Intention.