Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions

H. Peyton Young

ISBN 10: 0691086877 / ISBN 13: 9780691086873

Editore: Princeton University Press, 2001

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nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties.The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.

Codice articolo 9780691086873

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Individual Strategy and Social Structure : An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions
• Editore: Princeton University Press
• Data di pubblicazione: 2001
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0691086877
• ISBN 13: 9780691086873
• Rilegatura: Taschenbuch
• Condizione: Neu
• Dimensioni: 234 L x 156 A x 13 P (millimetri) 234 millimetri di larghezza per 156 millimetri di altezza per 13 millimetri di profondità
• Peso: 359 grammi

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.

Informazioni sull?autore

H. Peyton Young is Scott and Barbara Black Professor of Economics at The Johns Hopkins University and Codirector of the Center
on Social and Economic Dynamics at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of Equity: In Theory and Practice (Princeton).