Information Structures in Economics: Studies in the Theory of Markets with Imperfect Information. Questo articolo non è disponibile.
Lingua: inglese
Editore: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1982
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Trade paperback (US). Glued binding. 240 p. Lecture Notes in Economic and Mathematical Systems, 196. Audience: General/trade. Very good. light shelfwear, mild page toning.
Codice articolo Alibris.0028163
- Titolo
- Information Structures in Economics: Studies in the Theory of Markets with Imperfect Information
- Autore
- Nermuth, M
- Editore
- Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
- Anno di pubblicazione
- 1982
- Rilegatura
- Trade paperback
- Lingua
- inglese
- ISBN 10
- 3540111867
- ISBN 13
- 9783540111863
This book is intended as a contribution to the theory of markets with imperfect information. The subject being nearly limitless, only certain selected topics are discussed. These are outlined in the Introduction (Ch. 0). The remainder of the book is divided into three parts. All results of economic significance are contained in Parts II & III. Part I introduces the main tools for the analysis, in particular the concept of an information structure. Although most of the material presented in Part I is not original, it is hoped that the detailed and self-contained exposition will help the reader to understand not only the following pages, but also the existing technical and variegated literature on markets with imperfect information. The mathematical prerequisites needed, but not explained in the text rarely go beyond elementary calculus and probability theory. Whenever more advanced concepts are used, I have made an effort to give an intuitive explanation as well, so that the argument can also be followed on a non-technical level (cf. e.g. the treatment of the "generic" viewpoint in Ch. 9). In the same spirit, discussion of mathematical assumptions is limited to those which have economic sig- ficance, whereas purely "technical" assumptions (like differentiability or integrability of certain functions) are usually made without comment whenever convenient. The logical interdependence of chapters is as follows: Ch. 3 . Ch. 1 /~I--=---- Ch. 4 Ch. 2 Ch. 8 ~I -=--- /"'-.... Ch.
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Contenuti
Ch. 0. Introduction.- 0.1. Scope and Approach of the Book.- 0.2. Summary of Contents.- 0.3. Further Remarks and References.- I. Preliminaries.- Ch. 1. Information Structures.- 1.1. Definition of an Information Structure.- 1.2. Decision Rules.- 1.3. Comparison of Information Structures.- 1.4. The Continuous Case.- 1.5. Further Remarks and References.- Ch. 2. Examples of Information Structures.- 2.1. Noiseless Information.- 2.2. Perfect Information and No Information.- 2.3. Binary Information Structures.- 2.4. Vector Information Structures.- 2.5. A Continuous Example.- 2.6. A Discrete Example.- 2.7. Further Remarks and References.- Ch. 3. Some Game Theory.- 3.1. Imperfect Competition and Strategic Behavior.- 3.2. Noncooperative Games.- 3.3. Further Remarks and References.- II. Oligopolistic Markets with Imperfectly Informed Buyers.- Ch. 4. The Basic Model.- 4.1. Introduction.- 4.2. Firms.- 4.3. Households.- 4.4. The Market Game.- 4.5. Some Special Cases.- 4.6. Discussion of the Basic Model.- 4.7. Further Remarks and References.- Ch. 5. Symmetric Market Structure with n Firms.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. General Assumptions and Results.- 5.3. A Class of Symmetric Information Structures.- 5.4. An Existence Theorem.- 5.5. A Nonexistence Theorem.- 5.6. Further Remarks and References.- Ch. 6. Asymmetric Duopoly.- 6.1. Introduction.- 6.2. Assumptions.- 6.3. Equilibria with a “Naive” Decision Rule.- 6.4. Equilibria with a “Bayesian” Decision Rule.- 6.5. Price Dispersion Equilibria.- 6.6. Further Remarks and References.- Ch. 7. Judging Quality by Price.- 7.1. Introduction.- 7.2. Firms.- 7.3. Households.- 7.4. The Market Game.- 7.5. Existence of Equilibrium.- 7.6. Properties of Equilibrium.- 7.7. Further Remarks and References.- III. Sequential Futures Markets.- Ch. 8. The Model and Some Basic Properties.- 8.1. Introduction.- 8.2. The Data of the Model.- 8.3. Optimal Strategies and the Value of Information.- 8.4. Existence of an Optimal Strategy.- 8.5. Marginal Conditions.- 8.6. Continuity of the Value of Information.- 8.7. Further Remarks and References.- Ch. 9. The Value of Information in Sequential Futures Markets.- 9.1. Upper and Lower Bounds.- 9.2. The “Generic” Viewpoint.- 9.3. Generic Theorems.- 9.4. The Case of a Quadratic Utility Function.- 9.5. Two Examples.- 9.6. Further Remarks and References.- Ch. 10. Generalizations.- 10.1. Sequential Futures Markets with Many Periods.- 10.2. Options.- 10.3. Further Remarks and References.- References.
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