One of the classic early monographs on game theory, this comprehensive overview illustrates the theory's applications to situations involving conflicts of interest, including economic, social, political, and military contexts. Contents include a survey of rectangular games; a method of approximating the value of a game; games in extensive form and those with infinite strategies; distribution functions; Stieltjes integrals; the fundamental theorem for continuous games; separable games; games with convex payoff functions; applications to statistical inference; and much more. Appropriate for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses; a familiarity with advanced calculus is assumed. 1952 edition. 51 figures. 8 tables.
1. Rectangular Games 2. The Fundamental Theorem for Rectangular Games 3. The Solutions of a Rectangular Game 4. A Method of Approximating the Value of a Game 5. Games in Extensive Form 6. Games in Extensive Form--General Theory 7. Games with Infinitely Many Strategies 8. Distribution Functions 9. Stieltjes Integrals 10. The Fundamental Theorem for Continuous Games 11. Separable Games 12. Games with Convex Payoff Functions 13. Applications to Statistical Inference 14. Linear Programming 15. Zero-sum n-Person Games 16. Solutions of n-Person Games 17. Games Without Zero-sum Restriction: The von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory 18. Some Open Problems Bibliography. Index.