On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research

Long, Austin

ISBN 10: 0833039261 / ISBN 13: 9780833039262

Editore: RAND Corporation, 2006

Riguardo questo articolo

This is a pre-loved book that shows moderate signs of wear from previous reading. You may notice creases, edge wear, or a cracked spine, but it remains in solid, readable condition.Please note:-May include library or rental stickers, stamps, or markings.-Supplemental materials e.g., CDs, access codes, inserts are not guaranteed.-Box sets may not come with the original outer box. If it does, the box will not be in perfect condition. -Sourced from donation centers; authenticity not verified with publisher. Your satisfaction is our top priority! If you have any questions or concerns about your order, please don't hesitate to reach out. Thank you for shopping with us and supporting small businessâ happy reading!

Codice articolo STM.CHB

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research
• Editore: RAND Corporation
• Data di pubblicazione: 2006
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0833039261
• ISBN 13: 9780833039262
• Rilegatura: Brossura
• Condizione: good

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

The challenges posed by insurgency and instability have proved difficult to surmount. This difficulty may embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency in combating the United States. Both the current and future conduct of the war on terror demand that the United States improve its ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This study makes recommendations for improving COIN based on RAND's decades-long study of it.

Product Description

Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom showcased the dazzling technological and professional prowess of the U.S. military in conventional operations. As more recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, however, significant challenges remain in confronting protracted insurgency and instability. The way insurgents have vexed U.S. troops and civilian agencies may also embolden future opponents to embrace insurgency as the only viable means for combating the Unite States. Thus, both current and future wars demand that the U.S. improve its ability to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Over the course of five decades, RAND has accumulated an impressive body of research on counterinsurgency, from theories of why insurgency takes place to tactical operations. The author provides an intellectual history of COIN theory, summarizes elements of successful COIN campaigns, and makes recommendations on improving it based on RAND's decades-long study of the subject. Covering a wide range of cases, from the British experience in Malaysia to the French in Algeria to the United States in El Salvador, the author points out that while specific details vary greatly, lessons of insurgency and counterinsurgency can and should be applied in Iraq, Afghanistan, and wherever else the U.S. may need to wage low-intensity conflict. On "Other War" provides an invaluable aid to understanding and developing successful responses to modern COIN challenges and should interest policymakers, decisionmakers in the armed forces, and specialists and students of military and political affairs. The term "other war," meaning pacification operations, arose in Vietnam to differentiate those operations from the "real war" of conventional search-and-destroy operations. This focus on high-intensity conflict has, perhaps ironically, resulted in such overwhelming superiority in nuclear and conventional military capability that opponents (with a few possible exceptions) are forced