The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development : Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions

Matt Andrews

ISBN 10: 1107016339 / ISBN 13: 9781107016330

Editore: Cambridge University Press, 2013

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Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.

Codice articolo 9781107016330

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development : Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions
• Editore: Cambridge University Press
• Data di pubblicazione: 2013
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 1107016339
• ISBN 13: 9781107016330
• Rilegatura: Buch
• Condizione: Neu
• Dimensioni: 235 L x 157 A x 20 P (millimetri) 235 millimetri di larghezza per 157 millimetri di altezza per 20 millimetri di profondità
• Peso: 590 grammi

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

Andrews explains why many institutional reforms in developing countries have limited success and suggests ways to overcome these limits.

Informazioni sull?autore

Matt Andrews is a fellow at the Center for International Development at Harvard's Kennedy School and the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. His numerous articles have appeared in journals such as Governance, the International Public Management Journal, the Public Administration Review, Oxford Development Studies, Public Administration and Development and the Journal of Development Studies. Prior to his fellowship at Harvard, Professor Andrews was a vice president of the International Consortium on Governmental Financial Management and supported various government leaders in South Africa during the transition from apartheid. He has worked in more than twenty-five developing and transitional countries as a permanent member of the World Bank and as a Harvard University academic doing research on development and government reform. Dr Andrews received his PhD from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.