Logic and System : A Study of the Transition from "Vorstellung" to Thought in the Philosophy of Hegel

This book will examine one of the oldest problems in understanding what Hegel was trying to do. What is the place ofthe Logic in the Hegelian system? That is, how did Hegel see the relation between "pure thought" and its origins or applications in our many forms of experience? A novel approach to this old question has been adopted. This book will study Hegers account of what he regarded as the dosest "illustrations" of pure thinking, namely the way we find our thought in language and the way philosophieal truths are expressed in religious talk. The preface will indicate the problem and the approach. The introduction will examine three recent works on Hegel and suggest how they invite the sort of study which is pro­ posedhere. of all wisdom, a time There was a time when Hegel was read as the source also when he was treated only as an occasion of ridicule. Both are now past. The attitude of metaphysicians is more cautious, that oftheir opponents more receptive. Each side is better prepared to allow those who hold an assured place in the history of philosophy to speak for themselves and reveal their achievements and their limits. In this atmosphere there is special reason, on both sides, for the study of Hege!. No one has made such extreme claims for metaphysical thought and developed it so extensively and systematieally. No one has demanded more from posterity in the criticism of such thought.

1. Three contemporary studies of Hegel.- a. J. Hyppolite.- b. Theodor Litt.- c. G. R. G. Mure.- d. Summary.- 2. The situation of this study.- a. The purpose.- b. The title.- c. The method.- I “Vorstellung” and Thought.- I The Description of Vorstellung.- 1. The meaning of meaning.- 2. Thought as Vorstellung.- a. “Das mittlere Element”.- b. Contingent and abstract.- c. Space and time.- d. Meaning as “Meinung”.- 3. Thought and Vorstellung.- a. Transition to formal thought.- b. “Verstand” and “Vernunft”.- c. The return to Vorstellung.- II The Place of Vorstellung in the Philosophy of Spirit.- 1. Meaning and place.- 2. The dialectic in nature and spirit.- a. Soul and nature.- b. Space and time.- The double character of time (47) — The appearance of space (48) — The appearance of time (49).- c. Place.- 3 Intuition (Anschauung).- a. The place of intuition.- b. The totality of intuition.- c. Attention (Aufmerksamkeit).- 4. Vorstellung.- a. Recapitulation.- b. Transition to Vorstellung.- c. Recollection (Erinnerung).- Temporality of the subject (58) — Verification: the synthesis of Vorstellung (59).- d. Imagination (Einbildungskraft).- Recapitulation (60) — The syntheses of imagination (62) — Verbal language (63) — Dimensions of time (64).- e. Memory (Gedächtnis).- f. Transition to thought.- III The Logic of Essence.- 1. Vorstellung and essence.- 2. The place of essence.- a. The two principles of division in the Logic.- The three “Books” (71) — Objective and subjective logic (72) — Externality within the Logic (74).- b. The logic of being.- Dialectic without relations (76) — Intuition and indifference (77) — The totality of being (78).- c. Transition to essence.- Essence and common sense (79) — Transition as reflection (80) — Double sense of reflection (83) — Language and the double categories of essence (84).- d. Development to actuality.- The growth of a totality (87) — Verification and recognition (88).- e. Transition to the notion.- 3. Essence as reflection into itself.- a. Essential and unessential: “Schein”.- The presupposition of being (94) — The positing of being (95).- b. Positing reflection.- Positing and presupposing (97) — The “in so far” (99).- c. External reflection.- The origin of Vorstellung (101) — Thought as historical (102).- d. Contradiction.- The principle of contradiction (toy) — The final stage of thought (107).- e. Ground.- Self-grounding of the totality (111) — The nature and element of spirit (114) — Transition (115).- II Logic and System.- IV Development toward System.- 1. The problem re-stated.- 2. Dualism and system.- 3. The “Jugendschriften” and origins of the system.- a. Tübingen, Berne, Frankfurt.- First attitude to positivity (124) — Second attitude to positivity (125) — Reconciliation (126) — “Glauben und Sein” (127) — “Systemfragment” (128).- b. Publications at Jena.- Transition to philosophy (129) — Philosophy as system (129) — Scepticism, common sense, and philosophy (131) — Attitude to Fichte and Schelling (“Differenzschrift”) (133) — Attitude to Kant (“Glauben und Wissen”) (135).- c. The Jena “systems”.- Their content (137) — The principles of division (138) — Conclusions (141).- d. Origin of the Phenomenology.- V The System in the Element of Vorstellung.- 1. Recapitulation.- 2. Absolute spirit in the form of Vorstellung.- a. Transition to absolute spirit.- Finite and absolute spirit (151) — Identity of subjective and objective (153) — Identity of form and content (155).- b. Development in absolute spirit.- Religion as development (156) — Temporal development (158).- c. The “other” of thought.- The three elements of religion (159) — Relation to the duality of essence (162).- d. Spirit as result and as origin.- “Offenbarung” and “Erhebung” (165) — Logic and Phenomenology (166).- 3. System in the form of Vorstellung.- a. The notion of system.- b. The three elements.- c. The element of thought.- Transition in thought and from thought (172) — The ontological argument (174) — Relation to essence (176) — Result and origin (177).- d. The element of Vorstellung.- The “other” of thought (179) — The need of reconciliation (180) — Transition to spirit (182).- e. The element of spirit.- The situation of philosophy (184) — The final identity (187).- f. System and history.- VI The System in the Element of Thought: Conclusion.- 1. Circularity and criticism.- 2. System and syllogism.- a. The doctrine of the syllogism.- b. The triad of syllogisms.- c. The mediating syllogism.- 3. The place of the Logic in the system.- a. System.- The need of system (203) — The thought of totality (203) — The transitions (204).- b. Logic.- Ambiguity and autonomy (205) — Explanation and verification (205) — Thought and experience (206).- c. Place.- The situation of man (207) — Man’s “element” (207) — The history of man’s thought (209).