This book is a journey on a bumpy road through the almostimpossible mission of Middle East peace. It iswritten in a narrative form as critical events have taken place. The concept ofa two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been around forquite sometime and Ben-Meir continues to support it as the only plausible solution of Israeli and Palestinian coexistence, living side by side. In his view, enough agreements and frameworks are already on the table; what is lacking is the courage, creativity, and commitment from self-served leaders who do not see beyond their terms in office.

Lost Perspectives

By Alon Ben-Meir

AuthorHouse

Copyright © 2009 Alon Ben-Meir
All right reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-4389-7167-4

Chapter One

WHY THE ROAD MAP IS DOOMED TO FAILURE May 9, 2003

Unless Israelis and Palestinians dramatically alter their psychological dispositions, prospects for peace will remain illusionary.

The second intifada has transformed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict creating, for each side, a new psychological disposition: to deny each other the conditions necessary for reconciliation and accommodation. The road map for peace ignores this new and fundamental reality, outlining instead cosmetically reciprocal steps for both parties to take to reach a solution when survival itself is seen by each as the central issue.

It is hard to exaggerate the repercussions and the implications of the second intifada, and how it resonated among the Palestinians and its effect on the Israelis. The first intifada (1987-1993) focused, true to the meaning of the word (a rough translation is uprising), on the tactic of civil disobedience to dislodge the Israeli occupation. In contrast, the second intifada was characterized by an armed struggle which quickly became a war for both sides' very existence. The intensity of the violence led to the destruction of nearly everything previously achieved in the years following the first Oslo accord in 1993: a Palestinian infrastructure, socio-economic relations, territorial concessions, and the destruction of mutual trust. The mindsets emerging from the ashes have immeasurably widened the gap between the two sides. These two views cannot be reconciled, short of some dramatic change.

As he visits the region to push for the implementation of the Bush administration's road map, Secretary of State Colin Powell should understand that brushing off big issues, such as the right of return for the Palestinians, and focusing rather on each side's taking reciprocal steps to ease tensions and then to build on this foundation, will simply not work in the long-term. The administration needs to recall that as recently as mid-2000, the Palestinians retained control of all their major cities while economic, social and cultural exchanges with Israel had reached a new high, as had cooperation on security issues. Israelis and Palestinians also appeared on the verge of reaching an historical accord, with the Palestinians gaining their cherished goal of statehood. Only a few months later, all of these achievements lay in the dust, replaced by intense mutual animosity and disdain as violence reached heinously unimaginable levels. Confidence building measures did not work because the principle of a two-state solution, based on the idea that each party had the right to exist side-by-side with the other, seemed no longer feasible to either. This change in mindset must be directly addressed if any road map is to be successful. Specifically, monumental issues such as the right of return of Palestinian refugees, the future of the settlements, and the drawing of final borders cannot and must not be left for a later date. In fact, it was the right of return that torpedoed the final phase of the Camp David negotiations in the summer of 2000.

No one familiar with the current political scene can suggest that today's conditions hold out more hope for a solution than those that existed three years ago. Even more distressingly, there is no sign that either side has reached the point of exhaustion necessary to create the mutual willingness to make the far-reaching concessions for peace. Here is why the present situation will continue until the underlying issues are addressed: On the Israeli side, the wanton and indiscriminate Palestinian violence, especially the suicide bombings, has pushed a majority of Israelis to the right, as shown by Likud's victory over Labor in the past two elections. Labor, along with other left-of-center parties that strongly supported a two-state solution on the basis of exchanging most of the territory captured in 1967 for peace, has lost its bearings. The Labor party has even grown almost irrelevant, particularly in the wake of the disastrous defeat in last January's elections. Thus, no strong opposition voices now exist in Israel who can challenge Prime Minister Sharon and the dominance of his and other right-wing parties.

In addition, the consensus among Israelis is that Palestinian-initiated violence is not just a means to end the occupation but aimed at Israel's destruction. This perception is what has created the new Israeli mindset which opposes intermediate concessions out of fears the Palestinian strategy is to destroy Israeli in stages. This view was strengthened by the Palestinian insistence at Camp David on the right of return, which if effectuated, would have meant the end, via the changed demographics, of Israel as a Jewish state.

Finally, the nature of the violence shattered the last vestige of Israeli trust towards the Palestinians, making any future accommodation far more difficult. Israelis hardly take lightly the repeated public calls by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other extremist Palestinian groups for the destruction of their state through continuing acts of terrorism and violence. Many do not trust even moderate Palestinian leaders, including the new Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas. They believe the Palestinian Authority wants to end violence not because it is intolerable under any circumstances but because it has undermined the Palestinian cause.

For the Palestinians, their new psychological disposition is no less compelling-a fact that makes future reconciliation even less likely, short of a revolutionary change in attitude. First, a substantial number of Palestinians believe that violence is the only way to make Israel evacuate the territories. Keeping up the violence, the argument goes, will lead to the liquidation of the state of Israel. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other extremist groups cite Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, presumably under Hezbollah's gun, as an example of how Israelis wilt when made to suffer mounting human losses.

Second, despite public utterances to the contrary, the Palestinian Authority has by design not come to grips with the reality of Israel. Thus, it never made any real effort to indoctrinate the people that Israel had a right to exist. Nor did the Authority try to disabuse ordinary Palestinians of their belief in the certainty of Israel's ultimate destruction. The PLO covenant to this day affirms this outcome, Palestinian schoolchildren are taught hatred of Israel, the media continues to incite the public against Israel, and suicide bombing is equated with martyrdom.

Third, for most Palestinians, the Israeli occupation and the settlements' policy are proof that Israel has no intention of evacuating the territories any time soon. Each new brick used in building new settlements or expanding existing ones are seen as another nail in the coffin of a Palestinian state. The occupation has left Palestinians with a sense of hopelessness, and even though Arafat could have ended the occupation by agreeing to the Camp David accords, very few of them know that a real opportunity for peace and a state of their own had been missed in the summer of 2000.

The United States has been, and will continue to be, the only power that can bring about peace between Israel and the Arab world. But for the last 30 months, the Bush administration tragically neglected the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. This neglect has largely contributed to the present situation. It is in the context of the two belligerents' intensified hostility, heightened self-denial, and their greatest mistrust of each other that the administration has presented its road map. Unfortunately, nothing indicates the Bush administration has achieved an understanding of the psychological dimensions of the crisis. The road map introduces no element to produce a dramatic push forward-a critical requirement to begin a process of reconciliation. Without this the road map is doomed to failure.

To make the situation worse, the looming presidential elections will soon put the road map on the back burner. The president is unlikely to invest much of his political capital in such an uncertain venture, especially one that also risks losing support of one of his main constituencies-the Christian Right-should he attempt to pressure Israel.

A ROAD MAP IN NEED OF A COMPASS June 1, 2003

For President Bush to breathe real life into the road map for peace between Israel and the Palestinians, he must first insist that two prerequisites are immediately met: The Palestinian Authority must publicly recognize and unequivocally accept the Jewish/Israeli historic right to exist in part of their ancient homeland and Israel must accept the Palestinian's right to exist as a free nation in the West Bank and Gaza.

The unequivocal acceptance of these two principles by the two parties is the only thing that can create a new national psychological disposition in each which will allow the parties to deal with the issues that have blocked any previous agreement. These issues include: the use of violence as a political tool, the Palestinian right of return to villages within Israel, the disposition of the Israeli settlements, the future of Jerusalem, and the establishment of final borders. Without the acceptance of these two principles, all the confidence building measures the administration is asking both sides to agree to will be tactical in nature and easily reversed, as occurred with the previous advances which were wiped out by the second intifada. Reciprocal confidence building measures to ease tensions may work for a while, but in the end will offer Israelis and Palestinians only the mirage of peace.

President Bush would be wise to recall the reasons behind the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in the summer of 2000. At that time the Palestinians could have realized almost everything they demanded from Israel. Former Israeli Prime Minster Barak was willing to concede all of Gaza, 97 percent of the West Bank, and a Palestinian foothold in Jerusalem. But Chairman Arafat viewed the prospective accord as just another stage in the process of eliminating Israel as a political entity. Thus, he insisted on the Palestinians' right of return, which had it been accepted by Barak, would have meant the end of Israel as a Jewish state. (The return of more than three million Palestinian refugees to Israel proper would have established the Palestinians as an absolute majority in less than 10 years, thereby obliterating the Jewish "identity" of the state.) In addition, Arafat refused to consider the prospective agreement as the final one, putting an end to the conflict between the two peoples and with each side disavowing any future claims against the other. Rather, Arafat insisted that he had no authority to commit future generations to any agreement that fell short of his people's national aspirations. In other words, from the time of the signing of the first Oslo Accord in 1993, he-and the rest of the Palestinian Authority-never conceded to the Israeli reality in the region, regardless of the territories Israel occupied. Arafat's refusal at Camp David dealt a devastating if not fatal blow to the peace process. To the majority of Israelis, it now seemed as if the intention of the Palestinian leadership all along had been the elimination of Israel in stages. Otherwise, why had the PLO charter which called for the destruction of Israel never been amended?

Israel made its own contribution to the political and psychological impasse with its expansionist settlements. To the Palestinians every new settlement was a symbol of an occupation with no end in sight, leading them to believe that Israel would never relinquish the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians could find no way to reconcile the settlements' phenomenon with their own aspirations to create a vibrant Palestinian state. Moderate Palestinians who had accepted the inevitability of the Israeli existence now bowed to the growing voices of the extremist Islamic and leftist Palestinian groups that saw no virtue in accommodating Israel even tactically. The nature of the occupation itself was also intolerable, humiliating the Palestinians in ways large and small, making them determined to throw off the Israeli yoke.

The second intifada, or I should say, the Israeli-Palestinian war, changed the conflict into a war for survival. This is why no confidence building measures will work unless the fundamental premise of each side's right to exist is reaffirmed in an unshakable, determined, and direct manner. Only then, will the Palestinian Authority be able to explain to its people why the right of return is no longer viable and the permanent cessation of violence, especially suicide bombing, is at the core of any permanent solution. And only then will the Israeli government be able to explain to its people why most of the settlements, which happen to be political and as such the least populated, must eventually be dismantled to make room for a functioning Palestinian state. Are these prerequisites necessary? The short answer is: absolutely yes.

After nearly three years of disastrous failure incurred by the second intifada, it has finally dawned on a growing number of Palestinians that Israel is there to stay. This realization might provide their new leadership with the mandate to commit itself to dealing with Israel as an unshakable reality. Meanwhile, a majority of Israelis (62 percent) want to end the occupation. Their support of this in turn has given Prime Minister Sharon the backing he needs to end the settlements' policy. A hint of the change in the air is his recent labeling the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza as an "occupation."

This is why if President Bush is serious about peace between Israel and the Palestinians, he must first demand that they unambiguously recognize each other's right to exist in their mutual homeland. Only then, will confidence building measures become the markers on the road map to permanent peace.

THE TRAGEDY OF CONCEDING UNDER FIRE July 6, 2003

Sharon must never resume negotiations or make any concessions under fire. The most significant achievement emerging from the Israeli-Palestinian renewed contacts under our sponsorship of the road map is that the Palestinians may have finally concluded that violence has failed not only to force Israel's hand but, as it has intensified, become a detriment to their own existence as a functioning society.

Sharon's response-however brutal it may at times have been-to the violence initiated by the Palestinians over the past 33 months, allied with his insistence never to negotiate under the gun, played a critical role in disabusing the Palestinians of their faith in it as a strategy. His policy, I believe, will in the long run be shown to have saved the lives of tens of thousands of Israelis and Palestinians and will perhaps be instrumental in saving the Palestinians' own commonwealth from utter ruin. The support of Sharon's strategy, albeit tacitly, by the Bush administration, the Arab states' inability and unwillingness to intervene, and Sharon's history of toughness, weighed heavily in producing the Palestinian self-reckoning. The danger that lies ahead is whether Sharon, under U.S. pressure, will be persuaded to continue to make further concessions, even in an environment of relatively low-level violence. Should he give in under such conditions, he risks destroying the fundamental premise on which current and future negotiations rest and may in the process possibly torpedo the prospects for ending the conflict anytime soon.

(Continues...)

Excerpted from Lost Perspectivesby Alon Ben-Meir Copyright © 2009 by Alon Ben-Meir. Excerpted by permission.
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