CHAPTER 1
Map Set 1: The March to Gettysburg
Map 1.1 (June 3-4)
By early 1863, the Federals held large chunks of Southern territory, supply shortages plagued the South, and foreign recognition remained elusive. In the West, Ulysses S. Grant's army threatened Vicksburg, Mississippi. In the East, Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was in winter quarters, cold and hungry but encouraged by the winter defensive victory at Fredericksburg the previous December.
General Lee contemplated a move north of the Potomac River as early as February 23. Major General Joseph Hooker interrupted Lee's planning in late April when he put his Army of the Potomac into motion toward Richmond. Despite the absence of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet and two First Corps divisions (on duty in southwestern Virginia) and being heavily outnumbered, Lee moved to meet Hooker at Chancellorsville in early May and scored one of the most stunning victories of the war. However, Lt. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson was mortally wounded and casualties were heavy.
The loss of Jackson prompted Lee to reorganize his army (something he had contemplated for some time) to improve its efficiency and make it easier to handle. He divided his infantry into three corps (three divisions each) and reorganized his artillery. Richard S. Ewell was promoted to lieutenant general to replace Jackson at the head of the Second Corps. The new Third Corps was created for Ambrose P. Hill, who was also promoted to lieutenant general.
Lee's thoughts turned once again to an invasion of the North. His reinforced army numbered as many as 75,000 soldiers — far more than he had for his earlier invasion that had ended in a bloody tactical draw and strategic defeat at Sharpsburg (Antietam) the previous September. Virginia needed a respite from war, the shock of an invasion might dispirit Northerners, and a decisive military success on foreign soil might ease the pressure against Vicksburg and compel other nations to recognize the Confederacy. The rich farms and towns of Pennsylvania also offered food, forage, and supplies for Lee's army. First, Lee had to convince President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet. Davis wanted to send troops west to relieve Vicksburg. Lee, however, prevailed.
His plan was bold. He would leave A. P. Hill's Third Corps in front of Fredericksburg to watch the Federal army while his other two corps slipped around the enemy right flank and pushed north down the Shenandoah Valley, using the Blue Ridge Mountains to screen his movements.
Two of Longstreet's divisions led the way north. Lafayette McLaws' men broke camp near Fredericksburg and marched for Culpeper Court House on the morning of June 3. According to Samuel Pickens, 5th Alabama (O'Neal's Brigade), "it was a very warm day & we were in a cloud of dust most of the time ... my eyes, mouth, face & hair were covered with dust." John Hood's Division on the Rapidan River moved later that day. George Pickett's Division remained far to the south at Hanover Court House. Two divisions of Richard Ewell's Second Corps (Jubal Early and Edward Johnson) stayed in camp near Hamilton Crossing, while the third division under Robert Rodes began moving north on June 4. Hood arrived at Culpeper about 1:00 p.m. that day; McLaws stopped at Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan; Rodes camped about one mile from Spotsylvania Court House. Hill's Corps remained around Fredericksburg.
Hooker's seven corps remained in their camps north of the Rappahannock River. John F. Reynolds' I Corps and John Sedgwick's VI Corps camped near White Oak Church, Winfield S. Hancock's II Corps near Falmouth, Daniel E. Sickles' III Corps at Boscobel, George G. Meade's V Corps near Banks' and United States fords, Oliver O. Howard's XI Corps near Brooke's Station on the Aquia Creek Railroad, and Henry Slocum's XII Corps near Stafford Court House and Aquia Landing. Two cavalry divisions, commanded by Brig. Gens. John Buford and David McMurtrie Gregg, remained near Warrenton Junction, while the third, under Colonel Alfred Duffié, occupied the area around Brooke's Station.
Map 1.2 (June 5-8)
June 5 found Hood's Division at Brandy Station, witnessing Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's grand cavalry review for President Jefferson Davis and other Richmond dignitaries. After the festivities, Hood's veterans marched back to Culpeper Court House. Rodes' Division advanced to Verdiersville, while Early's and Johnson's men broke camp after midnight and marched through the darkness, finally joining Rodes at Verdiersville on June 6.
Joe Hooker was not blind to the clouds of dust to the southwest and the absence of men to his front. Suspecting an enemy movement might be underway, he ordered Sedgwick to reconnoiter, throwing his entire VI Corps across the river to support his scouts, if necessary. Sedgwick dispatched two regiments, the 5th and 26th New Jersey, across in pontoon boats, capturing some 150 rebels from A. P. Hill's Corps in the process.
Sedgwick did not know it, but he had sent men to an area recently vacated by Rodes, Early, and Johnson. A. P. Hill promptly rushed Pender's Division east to counter the Federal probe. What appeared to be a promising excursion bogged down when Brig. Gen. Albion Howe's division met stiff resistance on the south side of the river. Sedgwick wrote at 10:30 a.m., "I cannot move 200 yards without bringing on a general fight. Before bringing over the rest of my corps, I await orders." Hooker quickly responded that the one division would suffice. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. James Wadsworth's First Corps division headed to Franklin's Crossing to support Sedgwick's probe.
The movement of Howe's division across the Rappahannock River froze most of the Confederate movements early on June 6. Lee quickly resumed the march when he realized that Hooker was merely testing his strength and intentions. As Hood's Division returned to Brandy Station from Culpeper Court House, McLaws' Division veered to the right of the Court House, halting at Stevensburg. These two powerful units were now in a position to cross the Rappahannock River and strike Hooker's right flank near Hartwood Church. Ewell's Second Corps continued its slow march toward Culpeper Court House, covering less than five miles that day.
The Federal V Corps also caused Hooker grief. Ordered to probe across Banks' and United States fords, Brig. Gen. George Sykes protested to his corps commander, George Meade. "I am opposed to any movement across the river with the forces I have ... it is hardly to be expected that anything reliable would be gained, even supposing it could be obtained from such sources," he wrote. An angry Hooker fired back, "You are not to disregard the order to feel the enemy a little."
Still unsure of Lee's movements, Hooker sent units of Buford's cavalry to Jefferson to gather information on June 6, but the usually reliable Buford produced little by way of results. Frustrated by his inability to get definitive information on Lee's positions and intentions, Hooker wired General Henry Halleck at 3:00 p.m. that all of his cavalry and 3,000 of his infantry were on the road toward Culpeper Court House. He ordered Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton to take his cavalry across the Rappahannock at Beverly and Kelly fords and head for Brandy Station.
The three divisions of Ewell's II Corps marched to Culpeper Court House on June 7. Rodes reached the town that night, while Pender and Johnson camped their two divisions within three miles of the place. Five Southern infantry divisions were now concentrated near Culpeper Court House by the evening of June 8. To the south on the same day, three of the five brigades of Pickett's Division left Hanover Court House.
The Federal army spent June 8 quietly, save for Pleasonton's cavalry, which advanced toward Brandy Station, and Brig. Gen. Horatio Wright's division, which relieved Howe's south of the Rappahannock River on June 7.
Map 1.3 (June 9-11)
During the early morning hours of June 9, Buford's division, with Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames' infantry brigade in support, splashed across the Rappahannock River at Beverly Ford, while Gregg's and Duffié's divisions and Brig. Gen. David A. Russell's infantry brigade crossed at Kelly's Ford. The movement triggered the greatest cavalry battle ever fought on American soil.
Pleasonton's 11,000 troopers only slightly outnumbered Stuart's 9,500, but they held one critical advantage: surprise. On Hooker's orders, Pleasonton had split his command to attack Stuart's cavalry near Brandy Station.
Buford's wing opened the battle with immediate success, driving the Confederates from the ford and toward Fleetwood Heights. The battle raged back and forth as Stuart fed reinforcements into the fast-moving combat as quickly as they arrived on the scene. Gregg's and Duffié's divisions entered the battle from the south, but persistent Confederate counterattacks stymied their advance. Both sides mounted charges and countercharges, battle lines became mingled, and troopers fought saber to saber. Although his men fought well, Pleasonton realized the futility of continuing the offensive and pulled his troopers back across the river, ending the battle. His men had acquitted themselves better than ever before against Stuart's veterans. However pleased they may have been with their performance, they still had not secured the vital information Hooker so desperately needed.
The five Confederate divisions near Culpeper Court House had not remained idle during the fight. They quickly marched toward Brandy Station to help Stuart's beleaguered cavalry, but arrived too late to render assistance and returned to their camps. The timing was probably good for Lee because Pleasonton's troopers withdrew without ever registering their presence. Meanwhile, Pickett's Division continued its northward march.
Lee waited 18 hours after the battle for Hooker's next move. When none came, he struck north again on June 10. Taking the Old Richmond Turnpike, Early and Johnson's divisions marched to Woodville. Rodes marched his division along a parallel road and camped for the night at Gourd Vine Church. After a rapid march, Pickett's men halted for the night about eight miles south of Culpeper Court House.
Hooker was still unsure of Lee's intentions, so the Federal army did not move save for Pleasonton's cavalry, which returned to Warrenton Junction, and Maj. Gen. John Newton's division, which relieved Brig. Gen. Horatio Wright's division of the Federal VI Corps on the south side of the Rappahannock River. In the midst of all his activity, Pleasonton reorganized his three divisions into two, consolidating the Second and Third divisions under the command of General Gregg.
Four Confederate divisions were on the march on June 11. Three in Ewell's Second Corps continued toward the Shenandoah Valley. Johnson's and Early's divisions reached Little Washington that afternoon and went into camp while Rodes' Division bivouacked about two miles north of Flint Hill. Of Longstreet's I Corps, Pickett's Division made a short march, ending within three miles of Culpeper Court House, while McLaws and Hood remained in camp near Culpeper Court House.
The Federal army's positions remained unchanged on June 11, save for the III Corps, which marched from Boscobel to Hartwell Church in response to General Pleasonton's urgent request for an infantry corps to move between his cavalry and Stuart's. The corps also patrolled the area between Kelly's and Beverly fords. The XI Corps took up the III Corps' positions at Boscobel. The Union corps commanders received orders to prepare to march the next day. O. O. Howard was to "march ... without delay by the most direct route to Catlett's Station." Pleasonton threw out patrols to ascertain enemy movements. Unbeknownst to Hooker, none ventured farther north than Waterloo Bridge, only ten miles beyond Beverly Ford. As a result, they were unaware that Ewell's Second Corps was marching toward the Shenandoah Valley.
Map 1.4 (June 12)
On June 12, Ewell's Second Corps entered the Shenandoah Valley through Chester Gap, accompanied by Brig. Gen. Albert Jenkins' Brigade of cavalry and the 35th Virginia Cavalry Battalion. The lush countryside impressed the men. Samuel Pickens of Alabama commented about the "most luxuriant clover [and] the splendid fields of wheat." The corps next marched through Front Royal, forded the Shenandoah River, and went into camp just north of Cedarville.
Upon learning that Maj. Gen. Robert Milroy held Winchester with about 8,000 men and that Colonel Andrew McReynolds commanded another 1,800 in Berryville, Ewell quickly formulated a plan. His goal was to clear the Shenandoah Valley for the advance of Lee's army, and the first step was the destruction of Milroy's men at Winchester. Rodes' Division (with Jenkins' cavalry brigade) was ordered to attack McReynolds at Berryville and then quickly march on Martinsburg to liquidate its garrison. Anxious to get a head start, Rodes ordered his men back on the road and they marched until they reached Stone Bridge that night.
A stream of information now reached Hooker, confirming that most of Lee's units had moved west and north. This was not a surprise; Hooker had spent much of the last week requesting permission from President Lincoln to drive south and capture Richmond. Leaving Washington uncovered was unacceptable, and Lincoln denied each request. Hooker could no longer wait in place for an order that would never come, and so sent units to interpose themselves between Lee's army and the capital. The I and III Corps marched toward Bealton — the latter corps reaching its destination that night, the former reaching Deep Run. The XI Corps marched to Hartwood Church, halting for the night in preparation for its march to Catlett's Station. The XII Corps moved in behind them. Sedgwick also pulled his troops back from across the Rappahannock River while the II and V Corps remained in camp. Hooker placed I Corps commander Major General John Reynolds in charge of the army's left wing, composed of the I, III, V, and XI Corps, and Pleasonton's cavalry. A cavalry division under Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel arrived from Baltimore to patrol beyond the Bull Run Mountains toward New Baltimore, Salem, Middleburg; Dranesville and Leesburg, and from there through the Blue Ridge Mountains to Front Royal and Winchester.
These were hard marches for the Federals. A soldier in the III Corps recalled the misery: "the dust combined with the heat caused great suffering. The nostrils of the men, filled with dust, became dry and feverish, and even the throat did not escape. The grit was felt between the teeth, and the eyes were rendered almost useless. There was dust in eyes, mouth, ears, and hair. The shoes were full of sand, and the dust penetrating the clothes and getting in at the neck, wrists, and ankles, mixed with perspiration produced an irritant almost as active as cantharides."
In response to the sluggishness of the army, Hooker issued General Order No. 62. Stern in tone, it reminded the officers of prior General Orders, set rules on the treatment of stragglers and non-military personnel in the camps, denied the use of horses and mules for non-military reasons, and restricted the use of enlisted men as waiters or servants. Hooker also reminded the officers of the importance of drill at all levels of the army. The orders were read to the men of each company and battery.
Northwest of Hooker, General Milroy threw out cavalry patrols to ascertain the enemy's position in the Shenandoah Valley. His troopers encountered and engaged enemy horsemen, and one patrol claimed to have seen long lines of Confederate infantry approaching Cedarville. "Impossible," thought Milroy.
