Matching, Learning and Social Network in CEO and Director Labor Market

Qianru Cheryl Qi

ISBN 10: 3659429341 / ISBN 13: 9783659429347

Editore: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing Mär 2014, 2014

Riguardo questo articolo

Neuware -The labor market of top managers and directors is not a market in the ordinary sense. Instead of a perfect market with a large numbers of buyers and sellers engaged in relatively anonymous exchange, there is a small market in which buyers and sellers are few and socially connected. Instead of principals directly transacting with agents, there is a disconnect between the interest of principals (shareholders) and their agents (directors). Instead of a low-risk transaction in which all the necessary information is freely available and widely circulated, there is a significant lack of information about potential candidates and about the position itself. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive study, both theoretically and empirically, to identify the impact of board learning, CEO-firm matching, and director's social networks on this labor market. Specifically, I explore the following questions: How do firms identify their new CEOs What is the role of board of directors in selecting new CEOs How do firms identify potential directors What is the role of social networks in this process How do director and managers' social networks affect firm value Books on Demand GmbH, Überseering 33, 22297 Hamburg 116 pp. Englisch.

Codice articolo 9783659429347

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Matching, Learning and Social Network in CEO and Director Labor Market
• Editore: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing Mär 2014
• Data di pubblicazione: 2014
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 3659429341
• ISBN 13: 9783659429347
• Rilegatura: Taschenbuch
• Condizione: Neu
• Dimensioni: 220 L x 150 A x 8 P (millimetri) 220 millimetri di larghezza per 150 millimetri di altezza per 8 millimetri di profondità
• Peso: 191 grammi

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

The labor market of top managers and directors is not a market in the ordinary sense. Instead of a perfect market with a large numbers of buyers and sellers engaged in relatively anonymous exchange, there is a small market in which buyers and sellers are few and socially connected. Instead of principals directly transacting with agents, there is a disconnect between the interest of principals (shareholders) and their agents (directors). Instead of a low-risk transaction in which all the necessary information is freely available and widely circulated, there is a significant lack of information about potential candidates and about the position itself. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive study, both theoretically and empirically, to identify the impact of board learning, CEO-firm matching, and director's social networks on this labor market. Specifically, I explore the following questions: How do firms identify their new CEOs? What is the role of board of directors in selecting new CEOs? How do firms identify potential directors? What is the role of social networks in this process? How do director and managers' social networks affect firm value?

Informazioni sull?autore

Qianru(Cheryl) Qi, PhD: is an Assistant Professor in Financial Economics at the School of Economics, Fudan University, China. Her research focuses on Corporate Governance and has got grants from the Ministry of Education of China, Shanghai Government and Purdue Research Funds. She holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Purdue University.