The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation (Hardcover)

Emily Jones

ISBN 10: 019884199X / ISBN 13: 9780198841999

Editore: Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020

Riguardo questo articolo

Hardcover. This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.International banking standards are intended for the regulation of large, complex, risk-taking international banks with trillions of dollars in assets and operations across the globe. Yet they are being implemented incountries with nascent financial markets and small banks that have yet to venture into international markets. Why is this? The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk andReputation explores the politics of banking regulation in eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It shows how financial globalization generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. Politicians, regulators, and large banks in developing countries implement international standards to attract international investment, bolster their professional standing, and further integrate their countries into globalfinance. Convergence is not inevitable or uniform: implementation is often contested and regulators adapt international standards to the local context. This book contributes to our understanding of theways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory decisions in the periphery, and the ways that governments and firms from peripheral developing countries manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalization. Drawing on in-depth analysis of eleven countries across Africa, Asia ,and Latin America this book shows how financial globalisation is changing politics of regulation in developing countries. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Codice articolo 9780198841999

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation (Hardcover)
• Editore: Oxford University Press, Oxford
• Data di pubblicazione: 2020
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 019884199X
• ISBN 13: 9780198841999
• Rilegatura: Hardcover
• Condizione: new

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

International banking standards are intended for the regulation of large, complex, risk-taking international banks with trillions of dollars in assets and operations across the globe. Yet they are being implemented in countries with nascent financial markets and small banks that have yet to venture into international markets. Why is this? The Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Developing Countries: Risk and Reputation explores the politics of banking regulation in eleven countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It shows how financial globalization generates strong reputational and competitive incentives for developing countries to converge on international standards. Politicians, regulators, and large banks in developing countries implement international standards to attract international investment, bolster their professional standing, and further integrate their countries into global finance. Convergence is not inevitable or uniform: implementation is often contested and regulators adapt international standards to the local context. This book contributes to our understanding of the ways in which governments and firms in the core of global finance powerfully shape regulatory decisions in the periphery, and the ways that governments and firms from peripheral developing countries manoeuvre within the constraints and opportunities created by financial globalization.

Informazioni sull'autore

Emily Jones is an Associate Professor at the Blavatnik School of Government where she directs the Global Economic Governance Programme <https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-programmes/global-economic-governance-program me> which fosters research and debate on how to make the global economy inclusive and sustainable. She is also a Fellow of University College. Emily's research examines the political economy of global trade and finance, focusing on the ways in which governments can exert influence in asymmetric negotiations. Emily teaches courses on international political economy and negotiation strategy and skills for public policy, specialising in international trade. She holds a DPhil in International Political Economy from the University of Oxford, and an MSc (distinction) in Development Economics from the School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London, and a first-class BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from the University of Oxford.