The Problem of Freedom in Marxist Thought

This study seeks to present the theory of freedom as found in one line of the Marxist tradition, that which begins with Marx and Engels and continues through Lenin to contemporary Soviet philosophy. Although the primary goal is simply to describe how freedom is con­ ceived by the thinkers of this tradition, an attempt is also made to ascertain whether or not their views are strongly deterministic, as has often been presumed by Western commentators. is in order regarding the scope of the term 'contemporary A remark Soviet philosophy'. The Soviet stage in Marxist philosophy stretche. s back to the 1917 revolution. However, for the purposes of this study only works published after 1947 were examined, and the vast majority of them date from the 1960's. Apart from the fact that most works of previous periods were not available, bibliographical indications, such as the titles of the articles in Pod znamenem marksizma, did not suggest that the theory of freedom was then a major concern. In fact, even 1947 there was little development of this theme until the upsurge after of works in philosophical anthropology during the last decade. On the other hand, it is not being suggested that the conception of freedom found in recent writings is representative of earlier Soviet philosophy, during the Stalinist 'dead' period or earlier. Only further research could establish that. This work was presented as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, under the direction of Professor J. M.

I: Introduction.- 1. Point of Departure.- 2. Nature of the Work.- 3. Previous Studies.- 4. Preliminary Survey of the Problems.- 5. Aim and General Outline.- I/The Classics.- II: Marx.- 1. The Emergence of Marx’s Theory of Freedom from the ‘Philosophy of Spirit’.- 1.1. Freedom as the Principle of the Epicurean Philosophy.- 1.2. The Spheres of Human Freedom.- 1.3. The Human Individual as Subject.- 1.4. The Liberal Ideal of Freedom and the Social Nature of Man.- 1.5. Summary.- 2. Freedom and Alienation.- 2.1. Man as a Productive Being.- 2.2. Alienation as the Loss of Freedom.- 2.3. The Overcoming of Alienation Through Communism.- 3. History as the Law-Bound Process of Man’s Liberation.- 3.1. The Laws of History.- 3.2. The Historical Conditions of Human Existence.- 3.3. Freedom as a Historical Category.- 3.4. Freedom and Necessity.- 4. Conclusion: Results and Undecided Issues.- 4.1. The Two Marxian Concepts of Freedom.- 4.2. The Question of Free Will.- 4.3. The Ontological Status of the Individual.- III: Engels.- 1. The Continuation of Marx’s Views.- 1.1. Freedom as Power.- 1.2. Freedom as the Realization of One’s Essence.- 2. The Freedom of Human Activity.- 2.1. The Insight into Necessity.- 2.2. The Structure of the Free Act.- 2.3. The Determined Character of the Free Act.- 3. Human Action and Historical Law.- 4. Freedom of Will.- 5. Summary.- IV: Lenin.- 1. Determinism, Fatalism and Free Will.- 2. Freedom and Necessity.- 3. Purposeful Activity and Natural Process.- 4. Voluntarism and Determinism in History.- 5. Summary.- II/Soviet Philosophy.- V: General Conceptions Concerning the Person.- 1. The Ontological Status of Individual Being.- 1.1. The Substantialist View.- 1.2. Individuals as Systems of Qualities.- 1.3. The Relationist View.- 2. Man as the Ensemble of Social Relations.- 2.1. The Bio-Social Nature of Man.- 2.2. Human Nature and Human Individuality.- 2.3. The Individual Subject and His Social Relations.- 3. The Problem of a Generic Human Nature.- 3.1. The Interpretation of Marx.- 3.2. The Distinction Between Class-Conditioned and Universal Human Factors.- 3.3. The Critique of Anthropologism.- 4. The Nature of the Person.- 4.1. The Normative and Descriptive Notions of the Person.- 4.2. The Specification of the Nature of the Person.- 4.3. The Emphasis on the Social Determination of the Person.- 5. Concluding Remarks.- VI: General Principles of a Theory of Freedom.- 1. The Critique of Voluntarist and Determinist Extremes.- 1.1. The Critique of Voluntarism.- 1.2. The Critique of Rigid Determinism.- 2. The Appraisal of Hegel.- 2.1. Hegel’s Contributions.- 2.2. Hegel’s Alleged Shortcomings.- 3. The Role of Knowledge in Freedom.- 3.1. The Epistemological Presuppositions of Freedom.- 3.2. The Liberating Function of the Creative Cognitive Act.- 4. The Ontological Dimension: Determinism and the Possibility of Freedom.- 4.1. Necessity and Contingency.- 4.2. The Objective Possibilities Inherent in Reality.- 4.3. Causality and Choice in Self-Regulating Systems.- 5. The Structure of Free Activity.- 5.1. Preliminary Delimitations.- 5.2. Analysis of the Elements of Free Activity.- VII: The Different Types and Aspects of Freedom.- 1. Certain Aspects of Finalistic Activity.- 1.1. The Origin and Nature of Goals.- 1.2. Goals as Causes.- 1.3. The Dependence of Goals upon Values.- 2. The Explanation of Free Will.- 2.1. Free Will as Self-Mastery.- 2.2. The Nature of the Will.- 2.3. The Free Character of the Will.- 2.4. The Value-Orientation of Volition.- 3. The Moral Aspect: Freedom and Responsibility.- 4. Socio-Historical Freedom.- 5. Freedom as the Self-Realization of the Person.- VIII: Conclusion.- 1. Summary.- 2. Final Remarks.- Abbreviations.- References.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.