Problems in Mind: Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

This anthology focuses on four central issues animating the current philosophy of mind: mind/body, mental content, mental causation, and consciousness. The editor’s introductory essays provide a context for each article and where the article leads; reading questions help focus attention on crucial aspects of the selection, providing landmarks as students navigate the readings.

PART I. THE NATURE OF MIND

1. Dualism

René Descartes, Meditations II, VI / Alvin Plantinga, “Could Socrates Have Been an Alligator?” (excerpt from The Nature of Necessity) / Dale Jacquette, “Dualisms of Mental and Physical Phenomena” (excerpts from The Philosophy of Mind)

2. Behaviorism

Gilbert Ryle, “Knowing How and Knowing That” from The Concept of Mind / B. F. Skinner, from About Behaviorism / Daniel C. Dennett, “Skinner Skinned”

3. Type Identity Theory

J. J. C. Smart, “Sensations and Brain Processes” / Jerome Shaffer, “Mental Events and the Brain” / Saul Kripke, Lecture III from Naming and Necessity

4. Functionalism

Hilary Putnam, “The Nature of Mental States” / David Lewis, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain” / Jerry A. Fodor, “The Mind Body Problem” / Ned Block, “Troubles With Functionalism” / Paul M. Churchland and Patricia Smith Churchland, “Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality”

5. Eliminative Materialism and Instrumentalism

Richard Rorty, “In Defense of Eliminative Materialism” / Paul M. Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes” / Terrence Horgan and James Woodward, “Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay” / Patricia Kitcher, “In Defense of Intentional Psychology” / Daniel C. Dennett, “True Believers: Or the Intentional Strategy and Why It Works”

PART II. MENTAL CONTENT

6. A Language of Thought

Jerry A. Fodor, “Introduction: The Persistence of the Attitudes” / Daniel C. Dennett, “A Cure for the Common Code?”

7. Externalism

Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” / Tyler Burge, “Other Bodies” / Avrum Stroll, “What Water Is Or Back to Thales” / Robert Stalnaker, “On What’s In the Head”

8. Causal and Covariance Theories

Fred Dretske, “Misrepresentation” / Jerry Fodor, “Meaning and the World Order” / Lynne Rudder Baker, “On a Causal Theory of Content”

9. Functional and Conceptual Role Theories

Robert Cummins, “Functional Roles” / John Searle, “Can Computers Think?” / Margaret Boden, “Escaping From the Chinese Room” / Daniel C. Dennett, “The Myth of Original Intentionality”

10. Teleological Theories

Ruth Garrett Millikan, “Biosemantics” / Kim Sterelny, “Teleology” and “A Modest Proposal” / David Papineau, “The Teleological Theory of Representation”

PART III. MENTAL CAUSATION

11. Supervenience and Causation

Donald Davidson, “Mental Events” / Ernest Sosa, “Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation” / Jaegwon Kim, “The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism” / John Haugeland, “Ontological Supervenience”

12. Mind Matters

Jerry Fodor, “Making Mind Matter More” / Robert van Gulick, “Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing All the Work?” / Fred Dretske, “Reasons and Causes” / John Foster, “A Defense of Dualism”

PART IV. CONSCIOUSNESS, QUALIA AND SUBJECTIVITY

Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” / Colin McGinn, “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” / Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia” / Paul M. Churchland, “Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States” / Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know” / Laurence Nemirow, “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance” / David Chalmers, “Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained?” / Owen Flanagan, “Prospects for a Unified Theory of Consciousness, or What Dreams Are Made Of”