THE SUPER POWER VERSUS A REGIONAL POWER | A Game Theoretical Approach to the Current Nuclear Tension Between the US and Iran. Questo articolo non è disponibile.
Lingua: inglese
Editore: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2010
- Brossura
- Nuovo

Non disponibile
Brossura
Condizione: Nuovo
EUR 43,40
Descrizione dell’articolo da parte del venditore
THE SUPER POWER VERSUS A REGIONAL POWER | A Game Theoretical Approach to the Current Nuclear Tension Between the US and Iran | Sabri Aydin | Taschenbuch | 84 S. | Englisch | 2010 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783838373539 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, 49078 Osnabrück, mail[at]preigu[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.
Codice articolo 101031710
- Titolo
- THE SUPER POWER VERSUS A REGIONAL POWER | A Game Theoretical Approach to the Current Nuclear Tension Between the US and Iran
- Autore
- Sabri Aydin
- Editore
- LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing
- Anno di pubblicazione
- 2010
- Condizione
- Neu
- Rilegatura
- Taschenbuch
- Lingua
- inglese
- ISBN 10
- 3838373537
- ISBN 13
- 9783838373539
- Peso dell'articolo
- 143 grammi
- Dimensioni
- 220 x 150 x 6 mm
- Cataloghi dei venditori
- Bücher
This study investigates how the nuclear tension between Iran and the US is likely to result. Game theoretical analyses are applied in order to develop the argument of this study. Interaction between the US and Iran is analyzed by using two different forms of games, complete and incomplete information; and two different methods, backwards induction and Bayes?s theorem. It is concluded that Iran?s nuclear pursuit is mostly security based and the nuclear tension between Iran and the US creates a vicious circle. While Iran is going for nuclear weapons primarily to protect itself against the enemy states, the US challenge to Iran?s nuclear pursuit poses a security threat to Iran and makes Iranians much more eager to develop their own nuclear weapon capability. If Iranians are not bluffing and if they are determined to get the nuclear weapons, primarily because of security considerations, sooner or later Iran will have them. On the other hand, if the Mullahs intend to use their nuclear program as a leverage in their bargain with the West, they can only be persuaded to give up only by guaranteeing the security of the Islamic Regime.
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L'autore
He is a Phd candidate and working as a research assistant in the department of international relations in Uludag University Bursa, Turkey. He is interested in the studies on nuclear weapons proliferation and quantitative analysis in social sciences.
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