Taking Sides: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in Cognitive Science

This debate-style reader is assembled to introduce students to controversies in cognitive science. The scientific quest to understand human thinking and to imitate thinking artificially with computer software is surrounded by controversies from theory to application. The readings represent the arguments of leading cognitive scientists, researchers, and psychologists. They reflect opposing viewpoints and the issues have been selected for their substance, vitality, and relevance. By requiring students to analyze these issues and reach considered judgments, Taking Sides actively develops critical thinking, research, and presentation skills. For additional support for this title, visit our student website: www.dushkin.com/online

PART 1. Mind and Brain

ISSUE 1. Are Mind and Brain the Same?

YES: Paul C.L. Tang, from “A Review Essay: Recent Literature on Cognitive Science,” Social Science Journal (1999)

NO: Jon Mills, from “Five Dangers of Materialism,” Genetic, Social & General Psychology Monographs (February 2002)

Philosophy professor Paul C. L. Tang explains the argument that anything usually attributed to the mind is only brain activity by describing the position of Paul Churchland, a leader in the field of cognitive science. Researcher Jon Mills points out five dangers of dismissing a concept of mind, such as the elimination of free will and a sense of self, and instead proposes a psychic holism.

ISSUE 2. Do Children Develop Theories About Other People’s Minds?

YES: Henry Wellman, David Cross, and Julanne Watson, from “Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth About False Belief,” Child Development (2001)

NO: Brian J. Scholl and Alan M. Leslie, from “Minds, Modules, and Meta-Analysis,” Child Development (2001)

Senior research scientist Henry Wellman and his colleagues, David Cross and Julanne Watson, present a meta-analysis revealing support for their belief that stage-related conceptual changes bring about an understanding of theory-of-mind in small children. Cognitive researchers Brian Scholl and Alan Leslie argue that the data do not support conceptual change but rather the development of innate specific skills that lead to children’s understanding of theory-of-mind.

ISSUE 3. Is Mindfulness a Cognitive Style?

YES: Robert J. Sternberg, from “Images of Mindfulness,” Journal of Social Issues (2000)

NO: Ellen J. Langer and Mihnea Moldoveanu, from “The Construct of Mindfulness,” Journal of Social Issues (2000)

American Psychological Association president Robert Sternberg makes the case that the concept of mindfulness would be enhanced by association with the area of cognitive styles. Psychology professors Ellen Langer and Mihnea Moldoveanu find Sternberg’s cognitive style category inadequate and much too restrictive for the concept of mindfulness.

PART 2. Concepts

ISSUE 4. Are We Overestimating Infants' Math Ability?

YES: Leslie B. Cohen and Kathryn S. Marks, from “How Infants Process Addition and Subtraction Events,” Developmental Science (2002)

NO: Karen Wynn, from “Do Infants Have Numerical Expectations or Just Perceptual Preferences?” Devlopmental Science (2002)

Professor of psychology Leslie Cohen and his research associate Kathryn Marks make the case that infants prefer to stare longer, and thus respond more, to familiar situations as compared to novel ones, and that this has been mistaken for numerical understanding. Psychologist and researcher Karen Wynn argues that her assumptions are sound, and that infants are capable of calculating the outcomes of very basic addition and subtraction problems.

ISSUE 5. Can Infants Develop Abstract Concepts?

YES: Jean M. Mandler, from “Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in Infancy,” Journal of Cognition and Development (2000)

NO: Eleanor J. Gibson, from “Commentary on Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in Infancy,” Journal of Cognition and Development (2000)

Research professor of cognitive science Jean Mandler provides evidence to show that, counter to traditional cognitive developmental theory, infants are capable of abstract conceptual processing. National Medal of Science recipient Eleanor Gibson questions the assumptions Mandler makes regarding preverbal infants and presents her own view that perceptual development leads children into conceptual processing.

ISSUE 6. Is Sensory Information the Strongest Part of a Stored Concept?

YES: Helen Bird, David Howard, and Sue Franklin, from “Why Is a Verb Like an Inanimate Object?” Brain and Language (2000)

NO: Kevin Shapiro and Alfonso Caramazza, from “Sometimes a Noun Is Just a Noun: Comments on Bird, Howard, and Franklin,” Brain and Language (2001)

Researchers and lecturers Helen Bird, David Howard, and Sue Franklin present research consistent with a new model of knowledge representation that emphasizes sensory and functional categories. Linguistic researchers Kevin Shapiro and Alfonso Caramazza provide numerous challenges to the new model and caution against a search for one explanatory model.

PART 3. Memory

ISSUE 7. Is Novice Memory Based on Associations?

YES: Pertti Saariluoma and Tei Laine, from “Novice Construction of Chess Memory,” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology (2001)

NO: Fernand Gobet, from “Chunk Hierarchies and Retrieval Structures: Comments on Saariluoma and Laine,” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology (2001)

Cognitive scientists Pertti Saariluoma and Tei Laine present the case that through computer simulation they can demonstrate that associations made between frequent types of chess pieces and the colors of the pieces were the most salient aspects in novices learning chess patterns. Professor of intelligence systems Fernand Gobet argues that Saariluoma and Laine have not properly modeled human memory, and with a more competent computer simulation it is clear that proximity or location is the most salient feature in remembering chess patterns.

ISSUE 8. Is Imagination Inflation Imaginary?

YES: Kathy Pezdek and Rebecca M. Eddy, from “Imagination Inflation: A Statistical Artifact of Regression Toward the Mean,” Memory & Cognition (2001)

NO: Maryanne Garry, Stefanie Sharman, Kimberley A. Wade, Maree J. Hunt, and Peter J. Smith, from “Imagination Inflation Is a Fact, Not an Artifact: A Reply to Pezdek and Eddy,” Memory & Cognition (2001)

Professors of psychology Kathy Pezdek and Rebecca Eddy demonstrate through analysis and replication of a primary investigation that false memories are not being planted through imagination, but rather the researchers have been fooled by the statistical principle of regression toward the mean. Researchers and lecturers Maryanne Garry, Stefanie Sharman, Kimberley Wade, Maree Hunt, and Peter Smith argue that Pezdek and Eddy have performed inappropriate statistical analyses, and the proper treatment of the data further demonstrates the phenomenon of imagination inflation.

ISSUE 9. Is Adult Memory for Childhood Abuse Unreliable?

YES: Peter A. Ornstein, Stephen J. Ceci, and Elizabeth F. Loftus, from “Adult Recollections of Childhood Abuse: Cognitive and Developmental Perspectives,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (1998)

NO: Judith L. Alpert, Laura S. Brown, and Christine A. Courtois, from “Comment on Ornstein, Ceci, and Loftus (1998): Adult Recollections of Childhood Abuse,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (1998)

Professors of psychology and law Peter Ornstein, Stephen Ceci, and Elizabeth Loftus question the accuracy of adult memories for child abuse by explaining the many delicate and malleable features of human memory that can create false memories. Law professor Judith Alpert and clinical psychologists Laura Brown and Christine Courtois respond by challenging the memory researchers’ understanding of trauma research and psychotherapy, and by accusing them of undermining the healing process of abuse victims.

PART 4. Language

ISSUE 10. Is Context Stronger Than Frequency?

YES: Charles Martin, Hoang Vu, George Kellas, and Kimberly Metcalf, from “Strength of Discourse Context as a Determinant of the Subordinate Bias Effect,” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (1999)

NO: Keith Rayner, Katherine S. Binder, and Susan A. Duffy, from “Contextual Strength and the Subordinate Bias Effect: Comment on Martin, Vu, Kellas, and Metcalf,” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (1999)

Psychology professors Charles Martin, Hoang Vu, George Kellas, and Kimberly Metcalf demonstrate that human memory retrieval is influenced most by context when selectively searching for the meaning of ambiguous words. Cognitive researchers Keith Rayner, Katherine Binder, and Susan Duffy argue that when appropriate stimuli are used, research results indicate that memory retrieval is influenced most by the order in which possible meanings are retrieved when trying to find the intended meaning of ambiguous words.

ISSUE 11. Is Stuttering Isolated from Lexical Retrieval?

YES: Ann Packman, Mark Onslow, Tanya Coombes, and Angela Goodwin, from “Stuttering and Lexical Retrieval,” Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics (2001)

NO: James Au-Yeung and Peter Howell, from “Non-Word Reading, Lexical Retrieval and Stuttering: Comments on Packman, Onslow, Coombes and Goodwin,” Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics (2002)

Senior researchers Ann Packman and Mark Onslow, along with their research assistants Tanya Coombes and Angela Goodwin, demonstrate that stuttering occurs even when there is no lexical or meaningful content connected to the spoken words. Computational linguist James Au-Yeung and professor of experimental ps ychology Peter Howell argue that the study by Packman, et al. is so full of flaws that it explains very little about stuttering.