Thunder on Dnepr: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg

Fugate, Bryan, Dvoretsky, Lev

ISBN 10: 0891415297 / ISBN 13: 9780891415299

Editore: Presidio Press, 1997

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• Titolo: Thunder on Dnepr: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg
• Editore: Presidio Press
• Data di pubblicazione: 1997
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0891415297
• ISBN 13: 9780891415299
• Rilegatura: Hardcover

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Riassunto

Argues that Germany's defeat was due to the strategies of Generals Zhukov and Timoshenko

Product Description

It has long been thought that the failure of Germany to defeat Russia in 1941 was due primarily to interference in the plans and operations of the German armed forces by Adolf Hitler, and ultimately, that it was Field Marshal "Winter" and General "Mud" that stopped Army Group Center at the gates of Moscow. Certainly, the STAVKA (Soviet High Command) and the Red Army had little or nothing to do with it. But to Dr. Bryan Fugate, this view is too simplistic. A renowned expert on Soviet and German military history - he speaks both German and Russian - Fugate has long understood the great significance of the strategy developed by Soviet Generals Zhukov and Timoshenko that inflicted the devastating casualties on the advancing Nazis, making German victory impossible. This was the foundation of Fugate's previous book, the critically acclaimed and controversial Operation Barbarossa, a landmark study that brought the conventional historians out of their ivory towers into battle. Taking advantage of the new spirit of openness in the former Soviet Union, Fugate visited Russia to investigate precisely how the Soviets were able to outfox both Hitler and his acclaimed generals. In doing so, he teamed up with the eminent Soviet historian Lev Dvoretsky, using the most up-to-date research in formerly secret Soviet military and political archives. The result of this collaboration is Thunder on the Dnepr, a definitive work providing conclusive evidence that despite serious mistakes made by the Germans, the primary reason the Red Army was to prevail was due to war games conducted by Zhukov and Timoshenko in late 1940 and early 1941. The results of these exercises convinced Stalin that the Germans could bedefeated before they reached Moscow, but that existing plans for the Red Army to counterattack immediately when the Germans launched their invasion were futile.