A Subject With No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics

Burgess, John P.; Rosen, Gideon

ISBN 10: 0198236158 / ISBN 13: 9780198236153

Editore: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997

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First edition, hardcover, has a very slight lean to the binding, mild bumps to the spine ends, a hint of wear to the cover edges and corners with a small ding to the tail of the back cover, and a touch of smudging to the first free end page. Overall, a Very Good+ copy in a like, unclipped dust jacket, which has mild bumps to the spine ends and cover corners, slight wear to the cover edges, and a touch of rubbing to the covers. The jacket is wrapped in Mylar.

Codice articolo 204541

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: A Subject With No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics
• Editore: Clarendon Press, Oxford
• Data di pubblicazione: 1997
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0198236158
• ISBN 13: 9780198236153
• Rilegatura: Hardcover
• Edizione: First Edition.
• Condizione: Very Good+
• Condizione della sovraccoperta: Very Good+
• Cataloghi dei venditori:
  • Mathematics

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no such objects, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects.

A Subject With No Object cuts through a host of technicalities that have obscured previous discussions of these projects, and presents clear, concise accounts, with minimal prerequisites, of a dozen strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics, thus equipping the reader to evaluate each and to compare different ones. The authors also offer critical discussion, rare in the literature, of the aims and claims of nominalistic interpretation, suggesting that it is significant in a very different way from that usually assumed.

Informazioni sull?autore

John Burgess is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, where he has taught since 1975. He has published widely on the philosophy of mathematics and logic.

Gideon Rosen is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. He was previously Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan and a Visiting Lecturer at the University of Auckland, New Zealand.