army command general staff colleg (17 risultati)

Paperback. Condizione: Fair. No Jacket. Readable copy. Pages may have considerable notes/highlighting. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

Condizione: New.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. The U.S. Army has made significant adaptations to its warfighting skills in response to the operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan. This adaptation is evident in the implementation of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine that has guided the brigade combat team's training and preparation in both of these wars over the last 10 years. However, the United States Army is beginning to move away from the current fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. This will mean brigade combat teams will now shift their focus from winning the current fight to preparing for the next possible threat. Although the Army must continue to prepare for ongoing operations, brigade combat teams cannot shortchange their soldiers or the nation with respect to preparing and training for potential combat operations. As General Robert Cone, the Commanding General of the United States Training and Doctrine Command recently stated, "The real art is finding the right balance that allows the Army to succeed in the current fight while simultaneously preparing for the future." This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. This historical study investigates the military effectiveness and combat power of Civil War balloons. The categories inherent to military effectiveness include timeliness, accuracy, usefulness, operational considerations, and logistics. Limited by available material, especially those documenting Confederate efforts, this book highlights the history of ballooning prior to the Civil War, and focuses on the Union balloon operations during the initial fall and winter of 1861-2, the Peninsular campaign, and Chancellorsville. The analysis of the measures of effectiveness from these three periods indicates the Union balloon corps amply validated its worth. War, however, is more then just science. In this case, the "art" of warfare better explains the collapse of Thaddeus Lowe's organization after Chancellorsville. The first two modern implications of this case study involve both the unfavorable impact of personality, and the commander's influence on the assimilation of new technology. Are we better today at bringing on line the benefits associated with technology? The final point links tot he concept of battle command. With the massive infusion of information available tot he modern commander, are we still sending him to the lions without a whip? This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. On 26 July 1950 American soldiers from 2-7 Cavalry fired on civilians near No Gun Ri, South Korea. These civilians remained trapped under a bridge between North Korean and American forces for three days. In September 1999, the Associated Press (AP) reported that American soldiers killed hundreds of Koreans at No Gun Ri, under the orders of officers with a blatant disregard for civilian life. This story prompted an investigation by the Department of the Army Inspector General that found evidence of war crimes inconclusive, but acknowledged that Americans killed Korean civilians in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. Drawing on primary and secondary sources this thesis examines the actions at No Gun Ri to determine whether American forces committed war crimes and includes detailed research on the political situation in South Korea, the tactics of the North Korean People's Army, and the quality of the American Army in 1950. A thorough analysis of primary documents reveals a more complicated battlefield than presented by the AP. Direct orders were not given by officers to shoot civilians, but a poorly crafted policy from Eighth Army, and failure by subordinate commanders to modify the policy resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. This book studies the lines of communications (the Ho Chi Minh Trail) which went from North to South Vietnam, through Laos, during the Second Indochina War. The purpose of this book is to study the proposal that the United States, during the Vietnam War, should have used ground forces in Laos to block these routes. In providing background information, this study examines the nature of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, political and strategic considerations, and US military actions which were applied against the trail network. Studying the military feasibility of an interdiction effort on the ground, this study finds that the US was physically capable of mounting an operation into Laos to block the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The finding of this study is, however, that such a move would not by itself have provided a winning solution to the war. Additionally, such an attack into Laos would have had serious adverse consequences for that country and US desires for the region. The conclusion of this study is that in this case (the Second Indochina War) a ground interdiction of enemy LOCs would not have been a productive course of action. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. The partisan war in the Revolutionary War South demonstrated the vital linkage between the civil and military authorities. In the policies created to persuade the people of the righteousness of the American cause and neutralize opposition, the civil leadership of South Carolina inadvertently set the conditions for a violent civil war. The experiences derived from a century's worth of almost constant conflict, both internal and external, determined the nature of the ensuing civil war. Upon the occupation by the British in 1780, the calm that settled over the Southern colonies was brief, as British military leaders addressed the political problem in such as way as to lead to renewed revolt and an effective partisan campaign. The civil war became intertwined with the overall campaigns of the American and British forces, with the nature of the leaders having equal effect on the concurrent civil war. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. The embedded reporter program in Operation Iraqi Freedom was a huge undertaking, requiring extensive planning and coordination to organize and implement. The Department of Defense (DOD) invested much time and resources to help give the media relatively unfettered access to soldiers on the battlefield. A search on Google or any other search engine will yield a proliferation of articles and references on the embedded reporter topic. At present, there is much information, but limited relevant analysis that is of specific value to the battlefield commander or the strategic decision maker. The purpose of this book is to evaluate the feasibility of the DOD implementing the embedded reporter program again in future major conflicts. This book concludes that the embedded media program is a feasible and effective means for the DOD and the United States Army to facilitate the media on the battlefield and should be an element in media policy for future military conflicts. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. This book is an analysis and evaluation of the British and American campaign strategies in the Southern Campaign of the War for American Independence. After over four and one-half years of inconclusive fighting in America, the British government developed a plan to restore Royal control of the American South where large numbers of Loyalist Americans were expected to rally in support of the Crown. Control of the southern provinces would allow the British army to isolate the North where the rebellion was strongest. In May 1780, the American army of the South surrendered to a British army at Charlestowne, South Carolina. The Americans raised a new army in the South, but it toowas decisively defeated at Camden, South Carolina, in August 1780. American prospects in the Southern Department appeared bleak until the arrival of Nathanael Greene in December 1780. Despite a scarcity of resources, Greene rebuilt the American southern army and fought an inspired campaign of compound warfare to counter the expanding British control of the Carolinas. Lord Cornwallis led the British army on a protracted pursuit of Greene's forces across North Carolina following the American victory at Cowpens in January 1781. The British army, operating well beyond its supply lines, wasexhausted by the pursuit of Greene. Despite winning a narrow tactical victory at Guilford Courthouse in March of 1781, the British force was rendered operationally ineffective. Cornwallis withdrew to Virginia where he would ultimately be trapped at Yorktown.This book demonstrates the application of operational design using the British and American strategies in the Southern Campaign as a historical case study. The methodology for this study is based on the linkages between ends, ways, and means through the elements of operational design. Nathanael Greene ultimately succeeded because he implemented a strategy that was designed to match his means to his ends. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. In 1941, after the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, senior German military leaders were considering two airborne operations, one for the invasion of Crete and the other for the invasion of Malta. The invasion of Crete was executed from 20 May to 1 June 1941 with heavy German losses. The invasion of Malta never took place even though the senior military leaders in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) recommended invading Malta over Crete because of its strategic importance, but were overridden by Adolf Hitler. A year later, while the North Africa campaign was being conducted, another invasion was planned for Malta, but within a few weeks of executing the plan it too was postponed and eventually cancelled. The primary focus of this research is to establish why in 1941 Crete was invaded, but Malta was not. The secondary focus is to establish why one year later a second planned invasion of Malta was rejected and abandoned, and what were the strategic repercussions of not invading Malta. The Axis never captured Malta, and the offensive capability of Malta was never destroyed, thus leading to the defeat of all Axis forces in North Africa. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.