Mailath george j (41 risultati)

Condizione: New.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: Good. Good condition. A copy that has been read but remains intact. May contain markings such as bookplates, stamps, limited notes and highlighting, or a few light stains.

Condizione: Good. Item in good condition. Textbooks may not include supplemental items i.e. CDs, access codes etc.

Condizione: New.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Hardback. Condizione: Good. Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.…

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: good. This book is in good condition. The cover has minor creases or bends. The binding is tight and pages are intact. Some pages may have writing or highlighting.

Paperback. Condizione: New. It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.…

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 351 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Condizione: New.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: very good. Gut/Very good: Buch bzw. Schutzumschlag mit wenigen Gebrauchsspuren an Einband, Schutzumschlag oder Seiten. / Describes a book or dust jacket that does show some signs of wear on either the binding, dust jacket or pages.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condizione: New. It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.…

hardcover. Condizione: new.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 450 pages. 9.50x6.50x1.25 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: New. In English.

Hardback. Condizione: New. Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.…