vladimir krstic (21 risultati)

Paperback or Softback. Condizione: New. Deception and Self-Deception. Book.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 80 pages. 6.00x0.17x9.00 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: Good. Bon état -. quelques marques de lecture et/ou de stodckage sur couverture et coins mais du reste en bon état - envoi rapide et soigné dans enveloppe à bulles depuis france. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. Good.

Condizione: Very Good. Très bon état. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. Very Good.

Condizione: Good. Bon état. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. Good.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: Very Good. Très bon état - légères marques de lecture et/ou de stockage mais du reste en très bon état- expédié soigneusement depuis la France. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. Very Good.

Condizione: As New. Comme neuf - livre issu de destockage - pouvant présenter d'infimes traces de stockage - Expédié soigneusement dans emballage adapté. 23 37x30 23x1 78cm. 2019. Relié. 256 pages. As New.

Original Wraps. Condizione: Very Good. First Edition. FIRST EDITION. Original perfect bound oversized wraps (softcover). Numerous full color wraps. No previous owner's names, not exlibrary. Overall in VERY GOOD condition. Size: Folio - over 12" - 15" tall. Paperback.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Editions Soleil / Collection 1800 de 2020. In-4 cartonnage éditeur de 92 pages chacun au format 29,5 x 21 cm. Couverture illustrée. Dos carré. Plats et intérieur frais. Superbes illustrations en couleurs de Vladimir Krstic et Laci sur scénario de Sylvain Cordurié. Edition complète qui réunit les 2 volumes de la série. Etat de neuf.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 80 pages. 6.00x0.17x9.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive. This Element mentions that the traditional view, non-traditional view, and non-traditional approaches of self-deception are problematic. Self-deception is never accidental or a mistake. Self-deceivers need not benefit from deception, and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs. Self-deception need not be adaptive. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.