9780198250388 - Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief di Howson, Colin (25 risultati)

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. Revised ed. It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting.

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Condizione: Poor. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In poor condition, suitable as a reading copy. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,450grams, ISBN:9780198250388.

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Soft cover. Condizione: Near Fine. A small number of lines in pencil only, otherwise like new.

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PF. Condizione: New.

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Condizione: New. Physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion. Num Pages: 272 pages, references, index. BIC Classification: HPCD; HPK; HPL; PDA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 214 x 144 x 17. Weight in Grams: 362. . 2003. Revised ed. paperback. . . . .

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. Physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion. Num Pages: 272 pages, references, index. BIC Classification: HPCD; HPK; HPL; PDA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 214 x 144 x 17. Weight in Grams: 362. . 2003. Revised ed. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Condizione: New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title!

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PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

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Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Colin Howson offers a solution to one of the central, unsolved problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction. In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. No matter how many experimental tests a hypothesis passes, nothing can be legitimately inferred about its truth or probable truth.But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observablemagnitudes to many small places of decimals and within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory seems so remote that the possibility should bedismissed. This suggests that Hume's argument must be wrong; but there is still no consensus on where exactly this flaw lies. Howson argues that there is no flaw, and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion for relation between science and its empirical base. In the 18th century, David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw in Hume's thesis and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central problems of Western philosophy: the problem of induction. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Colin Howson offers a solution to one of the central, unsolved problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction. In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. No matter how many experimental tests a hypothesis passes, nothing can be legitimately inferred about its truth or probable truth.But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observablemagnitudes to many small places of decimals and within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory seems so remote that the possibility should bedismissed. This suggests that Hume's argument must be wrong; but there is still no consensus on where exactly this flaw lies. Howson argues that there is no flaw, and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion for relation between science and its empirical base. In the 18th century, David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw in Hume's thesis and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central problems of Western philosophy: the problem of induction. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Colin Howson offers a solution to one of the central, unsolved problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction. In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. No matter how many experimental tests a hypothesis passes, nothing can be legitimately inferred about its truth or probable truth.But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observablemagnitudes to many small places of decimals and within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory seems so remote that the possibility should bedismissed. This suggests that Hume's argument must be wrong; but there is still no consensus on where exactly this flaw lies. Howson argues that there is no flaw, and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion for relation between science and its empirical base. In the 18th century, David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw in Hume's thesis and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central problems of Western philosophy: the problem of induction. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Colin Howson offers a solution to one of the central, unsolved problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction. In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. No matter how many experimental tests a hypothesis passes, nothing can be legitimately inferred about its truth or probable truth.But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes to many small places of decimals and within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory seems so remote that the possibility should be dismissed. This suggests that Hume's argument must be wrong; but there is still no consensus on where exactly this flaw lies. Howson argues that there is no flaw, and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion for relation between science and its empirical base.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Hume's Problem | Induction and the Justification of Belief | Colin Howson | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2003 | OUP Oxford | EAN 9780198250388 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume s argument is flawed. Howson argues that there is no flaw and ex.