9780415558792 - The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in The Operational Level of War (Strategy and History) di Zabecki, David T. T. (23 risultati)

Soft cover. Condizione: Very Good. Softcover copy in very good condition. Minimal markings on one page, book otherwise is in great shape.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: New. In.

Paperback. Condizione: New. This is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after Potsdam was bombed in 1944. In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered translated copies of these files in a collection of old instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh insights to the German Offensives of 1918. David T. Zabecki clearly demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I, with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making processes during the execution of battles. This is also the first study in English or in German to analyze the specifics of the aborted Operation HAGEN plan. This is also the first study of the 1918 Offensives to focus on the 'operational level of war' and on the body of military activity known as 'the operational art', rather than on the conventional tactical or strategic levels.This book will be of great interest to all students of World War I, the German Army and of strategic studies and military theory in general.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. 2009. 1st Edition. Paperback. Series: Strategy and History. Num Pages: 436 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: GTJ. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 24. Weight in Grams: 650. . . . . .

Condizione: New. pp. 436.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Condizione: New. pp. 436.

Condizione: New. 2009. 1st Edition. Paperback. Series: Strategy and History. Num Pages: 436 pages, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: GTJ. Category: (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 234 x 156 x 24. Weight in Grams: 650. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condizione: NEW.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 1st edition. 414 pages. 9.10x6.10x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: New. David T. Zabecki has been Commanding General of the U.S. Southern European Task Force (Rear) and has served as the U.S. Department of Defense Executive Director for all World War II 60th anniversary commemoration events in Europe. In 2003 he was the Seni.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. The German 1918 Offensives | A Case Study in The Operational Level of War | David T. Zabecki | Taschenbuch | Einband - flex.(Paperback) | Englisch | 2009 | Routledge | EAN 9780415558792 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu.

Paperback. Condizione: New. This is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after Potsdam was bombed in 1944. In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered translated copies of these files in a collection of old instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh insights to the German Offensives of 1918. David T. Zabecki clearly demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I, with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making processes during the execution of battles. This is also the first study in English or in German to analyze the specifics of the aborted Operation HAGEN plan. This is also the first study of the 1918 Offensives to focus on the 'operational level of war' and on the body of military activity known as 'the operational art', rather than on the conventional tactical or strategic levels.This book will be of great interest to all students of World War I, the German Army and of strategic studies and military theory in general.

Paperback. Condizione: new. New Copy. Customer Service Guaranteed.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Condizione: New. pp. 436 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam This item is printed on demand.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after Potsdam was bombed in 1944. In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered translated copies of these files in a collection of old instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh insights to the German Offensives of 1918. David T. Zabecki clearly demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I, with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making processes during the execution of battles. This is also the first study in English or in German to analyze the specifics of the aborted Operation HAGEN plan. This is also the first study of the 1918 Offensives to focus on the 'operational level of war' and on the body of military activity known as 'the operational art', rather than on the conventional tactical or strategic levels.This book will be of great interest to all students of World War I, the German Army and of strategic studies and military theory in general. 436 pp. Englisch.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 1st edition. 414 pages. 9.10x6.10x1.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This is the first study of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 based extensively on key German records presumed to be lost forever after Potsdam was bombed in 1944. In 1997, David T. Zabecki discovered translated copies of these files in a collection of old instructional material at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He presents his findings here for the first time, with a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, to offer a wealth of fresh insights to the German Offensives of 1918. David T. Zabecki clearly demonstrates how the German failure to exploit the vulnerabilities in the BEF's rail system led to the failure of the first two offensives, and how inadequacies in the German rail system determined the outcome of the last three offensives. This is a window into the mind of the German General Staff of World War I, with thorough analysis of the German planning and decision making processes during the execution of battles. This is also the first study in English or in German to analyze the specifics of the aborted Operation HAGEN plan. This is also the first study of the 1918 Offensives to focus on the 'operational level of war' and on the body of military activity known as 'the operational art', rather than on the conventional tactical or strategic levels.This book will be of great interest to all students of World War I, the German Army and of strategic studies and military theory in general.