9780521138260 - Fiscal Governance in Europe di Hallerberg, Mark (14 risultati)

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. In.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. Based on data from European Union countries, this book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 246 pages, 5 b/w illus. 45 tables. BIC Classification: 1D; 1QFE; JPB; KCL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 230 x 147 x 15. Weight in Grams: 390. . 2010. Illustrated. paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condizione: New. Based on data from European Union countries, this book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 246 pages, 5 b/w illus. 45 tables. BIC Classification: 1D; 1QFE; JPB; KCL. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 230 x 147 x 15. Weight in Grams: 390. . 2010. Illustrated. paperback. . . . .

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 234 pages. 8.98x5.98x0.51 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 246 2:B&W 6 x 9 in or 229 x 152 mm Perfect Bound on Creme w/Gloss Lam.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 246.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 246.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there are few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. Based on original research on European Union countries from 1985 to 2004, the authors argue that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance dep.