Isbn: 9780521764575 - voting for policy, not parties: how voters compensate for power sharing (17 risultati)

Hardcover. Condizione: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

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No jacket. Condizione: Bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque avec équipements. Sans jaquette. Edition 2009. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Good. Former library book. No dust jacket. Edition 2009. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations.…

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New. This book develops an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice, examining three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 238 pages, 22 b/w illus. 22 tables. BIC Classification: JPB; JPHF. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 22. Weight in Grams: 48. . 2010. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . …

Condizione: New. This book develops an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice, examining three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Series: Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Num Pages: 238 pages, 22 b/w illus. 22 tables. BIC Classification: JPB; JPHF. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 228 x 152 x 22. Weight in Grams: 48. . 2010. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. …

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 232 pages. 9.50x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies.…

Hardcover. Condizione: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Condizione: gut. Voting for Policy, Not Parties: How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics) In englischer Sprache. pages.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. xiv + 220 Illus.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. xiv + 220.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. xiv + 220.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies. This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects post-electoral compromise (e.g. multi-party government), which dilutes their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Gebunden. Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects post-electoral compromise (e.g. multi-party government), which dilutes their vote. This s.…