9780691091846 - The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model di Laffont, Jean-Jacques; Martimort, David (35 risultati)

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. It's a well-cared-for item that has seen limited use. The item may show minor signs of wear. All the text is legible, with all pages included. It may have slight markings and/or highlighting.

paperback. Condizione: Very good condition. Cover shows some wear; clean inside. Ships quickly.

Broschiert; Condizione: Gut. 421 Seiten Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 905.

Condizione: Good. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: New.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: new.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. 2002. Paperback. Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Num Pages: 440 pages, 70 line illus. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 252 x 177 x 28. Weight in Grams: 924. . . . . .

Paperback. Condizione: new. New Copy. Customer Service Guaranteed.

Paperback. Condizione: New. Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits?Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Condizione: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,1000grams, ISBN:9780691091846.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits?Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability.Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about. Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: New. Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits?Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Condizione: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,1000grams, ISBN:9780691091846.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. pp. 440.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. 2002. Paperback. Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Num Pages: 440 pages, 70 line illus. BIC Classification: KCA. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 252 x 177 x 28. Weight in Grams: 924. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. illustrated edition. 421 pages. 10.25x6.75x1.25 inches. In Stock.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Condizione: New. pp. 440 Index.

Softcover/Paperback. 421 S. Einband gering geknickt, Buchschnitt etw. bestaubt NG014 9780691091846 *.* Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 870.

Condizione: NEW.

Condizione: New. Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information prob.

Paperback. Condizione: New. Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits?Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - 'Incentive theory is at the very core of economics. This text is a masterly exposition of the modern theory by one of the pioneers of the field, Jean-Jacques Laffont, together with one of its rising stars, David Martimort.'--Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study.