9780792362388 - Believing and Accepting: 83 (16 risultati)

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Condizione: New. pp. 312.

Condizione: New. The notion of belief figures prominently in contemporary philosophy of language and mind and in cognitive science. This work features essays that address a range of issues concerning the complexity of our belief attitudes, their contents, and the influence of motivational factors on beliefs. Editor(s): Engel, Pascal. Series: Philosophical Studies Series. Num Pages: 307 pages, biography. BIC Classification: HPK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 19. Weight in Grams: 1360. . 2000. Hardback. . . . .

Condizione: New. The notion of belief figures prominently in contemporary philosophy of language and mind and in cognitive science. This work features essays that address a range of issues concerning the complexity of our belief attitudes, their contents, and the influence of motivational factors on beliefs. Editor(s): Engel, Pascal. Series: Philosophical Studies Series. Num Pages: 307 pages, biography. BIC Classification: HPK. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 19. Weight in Grams: 1360. . 2000. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - (1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that 'beliefs aim at truth' . This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -(1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that 'beliefs aim at truth' . This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts. 312 pp. Englisch.

Gebunden. Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. (1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such thin.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 312 Illus.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 312.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Believing and Accepting | P. Engel | Buch | Philosophical Studies Series | v | Englisch | 2000 | Springer | EAN 9780792362388 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -(1) Beliefs are involuntary, and not nonnally subject to direct voluntary control. For instance I cannot believe at will that my trousers are on fire, or that the Dalai Lama is a living God, even if you pay me a large amount of money for believing such things. (2) Beliefs are nonnally shaped by evidence for what is believed, unless they are, in some sense, irrational. In general a belief is rational if it is proportioned to the degree of evidence that one has for its truth. In this sense, one often says that 'beliefs aim at truth' . This is why it is, on the face of it, irrational to believe against the evidence that one has. A subject whose beliefs are not shaped by a concern for their truth, but by what she wants to be the case, is more or less a wishful thinker or a self-deceiver. (3) Beliefs are context independent, in the sense that at one time a subject believes something or does not believe it; she does not believe it relative to one context and not relative to another. For instance if I believe that Paris is a polluted city, I cannot believe that on Monday and not on Tuesday; that would be a change of belief, or a change of mind, but not a case of believing one thing in one context and another thing in another context. If I believe something, the belief is more or 4 less pennanent across various contexts.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 312 pp. Englisch.