9780792384519 - arrovian aggregation models: 39 di aleskerov, fuad t. (9 risultati)
- Rilegato
Da: thebookforest.com, San Rafael, CA, U.S.A.thebookforest.com
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 4 stelleCondizione: Usato - Come nuovo
EUR 44,13
EUR 4,29 spedizioneSpedito in U.S.A.Quantità: 1 disponibili
Condizione: Like New. Page block firm and clean, binding tight, boards straight. No markings of any kind. Fine, like new condition. Well packaged and promptly shipped from California. US veteran operated.
- Rilegato
Da: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Regno UnitoRia Christie Collections
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 116,10
EUR 13,94 spedizioneSpedito da Regno Unito a U.S.A.Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Condizione: New. In.
- Rilegato
Da: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, IrlandaKennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd.
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 134,17
EUR 9,50 spedizioneSpedito da Irlanda a U.S.A.Quantità: 15 disponibili
Condizione: New. Investigates three formulations of the aggregation problem according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are defined, as well as to the form of desired social decision. This book offers a description of the problem of axiomatic synthesis of local rules. Series: Theory and Decision… Library B. Num Pages: 244 pages, biography. BIC Classification: JMH; KCC. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 15. Weight in Grams: 542. . 1999. Hardback. . . . .
- Rilegato
Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, GermaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 118,16
EUR 30,50 spedizioneSpedito da Germania a U.S.A.Quantità: 1 disponibili
Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent the `best' aggregation rule. In 1951 young American scientist and future Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow formul…ated the problem in an axiomatic way, i.e., he specified a set of axioms which every reasonable aggregation rule has to satisfy, and obtained that these axioms are inconsistent. This result, often called Arrow's Paradox or General Impossibility Theorem, had become a cornerstone of social choice theory. The main condition used by Arrow was his famous Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. This very condition pre-defines the `local' treatment of the alternatives (or pairs of alternatives, or sets of alternatives, etc.) in aggregation procedures. Remaining within the framework of the axiomatic approach and based on the consideration of local rules, Arrovian Aggregation Models investigates three formulations of the aggregation problem according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are defined, as well as to the form of desired social decision. In other words, we study three aggregation models. What is common between them is that in all models some analogue of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition is used, which is why we call these models Arrovian aggregation models. Chapter 1 presents a general description of the problem of axiomatic synthesis of local rules, and introduces problem formulations for various versions of formalization of individual opinions and collective decision. Chapter 2 formalizes precisely the notion of `rationality' of individual opinions and social decision. Chapter 3 deals with the aggregation model for the case of individual opinions and social decisions formalized as binary relations. Chapter 4 deals with Functional Aggregation Rules which transform into a social choice function individual opinions defined as choice functions. Chapter 5 considers another model &endash; Social Choice Correspondences when the individual opinions are formalized as binary relations, and the collective decision is looked for as a choice function. Several new classes of rules are introduced and analyzed.
- Rilegato
Da: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, U.S.A.Kennys Bookstore
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 166,84
EUR 9,03 spedizioneSpedito in U.S.A.Quantità: 15 disponibili
Condizione: New. Investigates three formulations of the aggregation problem according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are defined, as well as to the form of desired social decision. This book offers a description of the problem of axiomatic synthesis of local rules. Series: Theory and Decision… Library B. Num Pages: 244 pages, biography. BIC Classification: JMH; KCC. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 15. Weight in Grams: 542. . 1999. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
- Rilegato
Da: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, Regno UnitoMispah books
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 4 stelleCondizione: Usato - Come nuovo
EUR 172,56
EUR 29,09 spedizioneSpedito da Regno Unito a U.S.A.Quantità: 1 disponibili
Hardcover. Condizione: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.
- Rilegato
- Print on Demand
Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, GermaniaBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 106,99
EUR 23,00 spedizioneSpedito da Germania a U.S.A.Quantità: 2 disponibili
Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent the `best' aggregation rule. In 1951 young American scientist and future Nobel Prize winner Kenn…eth Arrow formulated the problem in an axiomatic way, i.e., he specified a set of axioms which every reasonable aggregation rule has to satisfy, and obtained that these axioms are inconsistent. This result, often called Arrow's Paradox or General Impossibility Theorem, had become a cornerstone of social choice theory. The main condition used by Arrow was his famous Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. This very condition pre-defines the `local' treatment of the alternatives (or pairs of alternatives, or sets of alternatives, etc.) in aggregation procedures. Remaining within the framework of the axiomatic approach and based on the consideration of local rules, Arrovian Aggregation Models investigates three formulations of the aggregation problem according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are defined, as well as to the form of desired social decision. In other words, we study three aggregation models. What is common between them is that in all models some analogue of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition is used, which is why we call these models Arrovian aggregation models. Chapter 1 presents a general description of the problem of axiomatic synthesis of local rules, and introduces problem formulations for various versions of formalization of individual opinions and collective decision. Chapter 2 formalizes precisely the notion of `rationality' of individual opinions and social decision. Chapter 3 deals with the aggregation model for the case of individual opinions and social decisions formalized as binary relations. Chapter 4 deals with Functional Aggregation Rules which transform into a social choice function individual opinions defined as choice functions. Chapter 5 considers another model &endash; Social Choice Correspondences when the individual opinions are formalized as binary relations, and the collective decision is looked for as a choice function. Several new classes of rules are introduced and analyzed. 260 pp. Englisch.
- Rilegato
- Print on Demand
Da: moluna, Greven, Germaniamoluna
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 92,27
EUR 48,99 spedizioneSpedito da Germania a U.S.A.Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Gebunden. Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent the `best aggregation rule. In 1951 young American scientist and… future Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow formul.
- Rilegato
- Print on Demand
Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germaniabuchversandmimpf2000
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 106,99
EUR 60,00 spedizioneSpedito da Germania a U.S.A.Quantità: 1 disponibili
Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent the `best' aggregation rule. In 1951 young American scientist and future Nobel Prize winner Kenneth…Arrow formulated the problem in an axiomatic way, i.e., he specified a set of axioms which every reasonable aggregation rule has to satisfy, and obtained that these axioms are inconsistent. This result, often called Arrow's Paradox or General Impossibility Theorem, had become a cornerstone of social choice theory. The main condition used by Arrow was his famous Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. This very condition pre-defines the `local' treatment of the alternatives (or pairs of alternatives, or sets of alternatives, etc.) in aggregation procedures.Remaining within the framework of the axiomatic approach and based on the consideration of local rules, Arrovian Aggregation Models investigates three formulations of the aggregation problem according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are defined, as well as to the form of desired social decision. In other words, we study three aggregation models. What is common between them is that in all models some analogue of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition is used, which is why we call these models Arrovian aggregation models.Chapter 1 presents a general description of the problem of axiomatic synthesis of local rules, and introduces problem formulations for various versions of formalization of individual opinions and collective decision. Chapter 2 formalizes precisely the notion of `rationality' of individual opinions and social decision. Chapter 3 deals with the aggregation model for the case of individual opinions and social decisions formalized as binary relations. Chapter 4 deals with Functional Aggregation Rules which transform into a social choice function individual opinions defined as choice functions. Chapter 5 considers another model &endash; Social Choice Correspondences when the individual opinions are formalized as binary relations, and the collective decision is looked for as a choice function. Several new classes of rules are introduced and analyzed.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 260 pp. Englisch.
