9780804735704 - democratic institutional design: the powers and incentives of venezuelan politicians and interest groups di crisp, brian f. (11 risultati)
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Da: Opalick, Augusta, GA, U.S.A.Opalick
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Condizione: Acceptable. Buy with confidence! Comes with our 100% money back guarantee!! Tracking included with every order!!! **** Access codes and supplements are not guaranteed with used items **** All items ship Monday - Friday in a secure bubble mailer . THE DUST JACKET IS MISSING !!!! The cover shows normal wear and tear .…Some corner dings . The pages show normal wear . Page corners are curled . This book is in ex Library condition, it will have some type of sticker on the exterior and a check out card on the inside cover.
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Da: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Regno UnitoTHE SAINT BOOKSTORE
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Hardback. Condizione: Good. Used copy in good condition - Usually dispatched within 3 working days.
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Da: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.GreatBookPrices
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EUR 88,12
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Condizione: New.
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Da: Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, U.S.A.Rarewaves USA
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EUR 90,51
Spedizione gratuitaSpedito in U.S.A.Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Hardback. Condizione: New. Based on the policy-making structures of Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the electoral system and changing partisan strengths. Sever…al institutional characteristics have led to a passive legislature and an activist chief executive. The advantages presidents enjoy as a result of their constitutional and partisan powers are demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence, including records of votes of censure, initiation of legislation, and the use of decree authority. Because of its dominance, the Venezuelan executive branch is the focus of interest-group pressure, which is institutionalized through consultative commissions and a decentralized public administration. The author analyzes memberships of more than 300 advisory commissions and governing boards, revealing the preponderance of posts filled by umbrella agencies for business and labor. The interaction of this limited version of civil society with policy makers in the executive branch has led to a highly protectionist development strategy and excessive government subsidies. The strategy and the political process that made it possible were both exhausted by the end of the 1980s. Venezuela was in political and economic crisis. The author places Venezuela in a comparative context with other Latin American states on three issues: the likelihood that executives will receive disciplined, majority support in the legislature; the constitutional powers of presidents; and the degree to which business and labor are formally incorporated through single peak associations. Participation and policy-making processes vary significantly across Latin American democracies, with few others reaching the level of centralization that has characterized Venezuela. At the other end of the spectrum, some Latin American institutional designs are characterized by diffusion and fragmentation. In conclusion, the author offers a blueprint to modify some of the counterproductive patterns associated with Venezuela, one of the longest-lived but now troubled democracies in Latin America.
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Da: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.GreatBookPrices
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Usato - Come nuovo
EUR 89,92
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Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
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Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno UnitoGreatBookPricesUK
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EUR 96,73
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Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
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Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno UnitoGreatBookPricesUK
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 97,09
EUR 17,65 spedizioneSpedito da Regno Unito a U.S.A.Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Condizione: New.
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Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno UnitoRevaluation Books
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EUR 114,28
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Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 1st edition. 273 pages. 9.50x6.50x1.00 inches. In Stock.
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Da: moluna, Greven, Germaniamoluna
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EUR 86,00
EUR 48,99 spedizioneSpedito da Germania a U.S.A.Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Gebunden. Condizione: New. Based on the policy-making structures of the Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature, and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the elec.
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Da: Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, U.S.A.Rarewaves USA United
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 97,08
EUR 43,80 spedizioneSpedito in U.S.A.Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Hardback. Condizione: New. Based on the policy-making structures of Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the electoral system and changing partisan strengths. Sever…al institutional characteristics have led to a passive legislature and an activist chief executive. The advantages presidents enjoy as a result of their constitutional and partisan powers are demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence, including records of votes of censure, initiation of legislation, and the use of decree authority. Because of its dominance, the Venezuelan executive branch is the focus of interest-group pressure, which is institutionalized through consultative commissions and a decentralized public administration. The author analyzes memberships of more than 300 advisory commissions and governing boards, revealing the preponderance of posts filled by umbrella agencies for business and labor. The interaction of this limited version of civil society with policy makers in the executive branch has led to a highly protectionist development strategy and excessive government subsidies. The strategy and the political process that made it possible were both exhausted by the end of the 1980s. Venezuela was in political and economic crisis. The author places Venezuela in a comparative context with other Latin American states on three issues: the likelihood that executives will receive disciplined, majority support in the legislature; the constitutional powers of presidents; and the degree to which business and labor are formally incorporated through single peak associations. Participation and policy-making processes vary significantly across Latin American democracies, with few others reaching the level of centralization that has characterized Venezuela. At the other end of the spectrum, some Latin American institutional designs are characterized by diffusion and fragmentation. In conclusion, the author offers a blueprint to modify some of the counterproductive patterns associated with Venezuela, one of the longest-lived but now troubled democracies in Latin America.
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Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, GermaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Nuovo
EUR 116,38
EUR 62,72 spedizioneSpedito da Germania a U.S.A.Quantità: 2 disponibili
Buch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - Based on the policy-making structures of Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the electoral system and changing partisan strengths.… Several institutional characteristics have led to a passive legislature and an activist chief executive. The advantages presidents enjoy as a result of their constitutional and partisan powers are demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence, including records of votes of censure, initiation of legislation, and the use of decree authority. Because of its dominance, the Venezuelan executive branch is the focus of interest-group pressure, which is institutionalized through consultative commissions and a decentralized public administration. The author analyzes memberships of more than 300 advisory commissions and governing boards, revealing the preponderance of posts filled by umbrella agencies for business and labor. The interaction of this limited version of civil society with policy makers in the executive branch has led to a highly protectionist development strategy and excessive government subsidies. The strategy and the political process that made it possible were both exhausted by the end of the 1980s. Venezuela was in political and economic crisis. The author places Venezuela in a comparative context with other Latin American states on three issues: the likelihood that executives will receive disciplined, majority support in the legislature; the constitutional powers of presidents; and the degree to which business and labor are formally incorporated through single peak associations. Participation and policy-making processes vary significantly across Latin American democracies, with few others reaching the level of centralization that has characterized Venezuela. At the other end of the spectrum, some Latin American institutional designs are characterized by diffusion and fragmentation. In conclusion, the author offers a blueprint to modify some of the counterproductive patterns associated with Venezuela, one of the longest-lived but now troubled democracies in Latin America.
