9781032914015 - Nuclear Alliance Restraint: Success and Failure in Countering Allied Proliferators di Lee, Dong Sun; Alexandrova, Iordanka (19 risultati)

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. In.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.

Condizione: New.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 208 pages. 9.18x6.12x9.21 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: New.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations. 200 pp. Englisch.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Dong Sun Lee is a Professor of International Relations at Korea University, Seoul, South Korea. He has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago and is the author of Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and Internat.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book examines why powerful states have varying success in restraining less-powerful allies from acquiring nuclear weapons, based on a broad range of historical case studies.The outcomes of nuclear alliance restraint primarily depend on two structural factors: the number of superpowers in the global system and the geographical distance between patrons and clients. Through in-depth case studies of South Korea, North Korea, China, and Pakistan and a comprehensive analysis of 14 historical episodes, the book demonstrates that restraint succeeds when there are two superpowers, with one trying to rein in a distant ally. Conversely, restraint often fails with a single superpower in the system or when nuclear aspirants are close to their patrons. This study has important implications for current nonproliferation efforts since it suggests that a bipolar world with the United States and China as superpowers would enhance counterproliferation effectiveness, reducing nuclear proliferation risks. In addition, an inducement-centered approach adopted early on would be most effective for these superpowers in restraining their allied proliferators.This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, foreign policy, security studies, and international relations.