ISBN: 9781107194182 - aristotle's concept of mind (16 risultati)

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: New. A fresh interpretation of this important and widely misunderstood concept as an acquired ability to make principles and essences intelligible. BIC Classification: HPCA. Category: (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). . . 2017. Hardcover. . . . .

Condizione: New.

Hardcover. Condizione: New. Brand new book, sourced directly from publisher. Dispatch time is 24-48 hours from our warehouse. Book will be sent in robust, secure packaging to ensure it reaches you securely.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New. A fresh interpretation of this important and widely misunderstood concept as an acquired ability to make principles and essences intelligible. BIC Classification: HPCA. Category: (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). . . 2017. Hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condizione: NEW.

Hardback. Condizione: New. In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.…

Hardback. Condizione: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 3 working days.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 240 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Gebunden. Condizione: New. This book challenges flawed readings of Aristotle s psychology, offering the first book-length treatment in English of his thinking about mind. Scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, and particularly of Aristotelian psychology, will find this original interp.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.…

Hardback. Condizione: New. In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.…