9781108701846 - Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations di Spaniel, William (15 risultati)

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Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

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Paperback. Condizione: Near Fine. No jacket. Cambridge University Press, 2019. Paperback, 8vo, xi,213pp. A very good copy. 9781108701846 . (Please note that our condition gradings are stricter than those of Abebooks and many other sellers. There may therefore be a discrepancy between this description and its listed condition grading).

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. It then explores impediments to a deal. The book will appeal to advanced undergraduate or graduate students studying nuclear security and formal models in international relations. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 213 pages. 8.75x6.00x0.50 inches. In Stock.

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Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. It then explores impediments to a deal. The book will appeal to advanced undergraduate or graduate students studying nuclear security and formal models in international relations. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: New. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. It then explores impediments to a deal. The book will appeal to advanced undergraduate or grad.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons. Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. It then explores impediments to a deal. The book will appeal to advanced undergraduate or graduate students studying nuclear security and formal models in international relations. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - This book uses formal models to explore the conditions under which nuclear agreements are credible.