Isbn: 9781332975495 - continuous time stopping games (classic reprint) (3 risultati)

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  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Forgotten Books, 2019

    1332975496 / 9781332975495

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    Da: PBShop.store US, Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.PBShop.store US

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    Condizione: Nuovo

    EUR 24,63

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    Spedito in U.S.A.

    Quantità: 15 disponibili

    PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Forgotten Books, 2019

    1332975496 / 9781332975495

    • Brossura

    Da: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Regno UnitoPBShop.store UK

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    Condizione: Nuovo

    EUR 24,37

    EUR 3,88 spedizione 
    Spedito da Regno Unito a U.S.A.

    Quantità: 15 disponibili

    PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

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    Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Forgotten Books, 2024

    1332975496 / 9781332975495

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    • Print on Demand

    Da: Forgotten Books, London, Regno UnitoForgotten Books

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    Condizione: Nuovo

    EUR 15,66

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    Spedito da Regno Unito a U.S.A.

    Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili

    Paperback. Condizione: New. Print on Demand. This book is an in-depth examination of continuous-time stopping games, a complex type of game theory where players must make strategic decisions about when to stop a process to maximize their reward. The author explores the theoretical foundations of these games, proving the existence of Nash equilibriaâ"situations where no player can improve their outcome by unilaterally changing their strategyâ"under certain conditions. The book also delves into the uniqueness of symmetric equilibria, where all players have identical strategies, and the subgame perfection of Nash equilibria, meaning they remain optimal even if the game is altered. By providing a comprehensive analysis of continuous-time stopping games, this book advances our understanding of game theory and its applications, offering valuable insights for researchers and practitioners alike. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work, digitally reconstructed using state-of-the-art technology to preserve the original format. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in the book. print-on-demand item.…