ISBN: 9781461428435 - the calculus of consent and constitutional design: 20 (10 risultati)

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  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer, 2013

    1461428432 / 9781461428435

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    Condizione: New. In English.

  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer, 2013

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    Condizione: New. pp. 132.

  • Lingua: Inglese

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    Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, GermaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH

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    Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Buchanan and Tullock's seminal work, The Calculus of Consent, linked economic methodology to substantive questions in political science. Among the major contributions of their book is a connection between constitutional decision making and contractarianism, a philosophical tradition that proponents believe can give institutions legitimacy. In other words, a major contribution of their book is a clear connection between empirical decision making and normative principles. The current book formalizes and extends their foundational ideas as it attempts to show how economic and philosophical arguments about the 'best' voting rules can be used to improve constitutional design. It informs debates about constitutional political economy in comparative politics, democratic theory, and public choice. Political scientists often ask questions about what causes a nation to seek a new constitution, how constitutions are made, and what factors allow for corrupt decision making. The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions are formed. This provides a benchmark to help create better constitutions and informs empirical research about what institutions are most likely to succeed. The book begins by showing how contractarian ideals can be used to justify choices about decision-making. It then carefully defines several concepts employed by Buchanan and Tullock and shows why the relationships between these concepts may not be as closely linked as Buchanan and Tullock first thought. This provides a backdrop for analyzing the three phases of constitutional decision-making: 1) the constitutional phase, where rules for constitutional decision making must be justified; 2) the legislative phase, where the optimal k-majority rule is analyzed; and 3) the electoral phase, where the optimal voting rule for largeelectorates and open alternatives are determined. These phases differ by context and sources of legitimacy. Computational models and analytic techniques are introduced in each of these chapters. Finally, the book concludes with statements about the significance of the research for the creation of constitutions more broadly.…

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    Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer, 2013

    1461428432 / 9781461428435

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    Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design | Keith Dougherty (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Studies in Public Choice | xii | Englisch | 2013 | Springer | EAN 9781461428435 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. …

  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer, 2013

    1461428432 / 9781461428435

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    Da: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, ItaliaBrook Bookstore On Demand

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  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer New York Apr 2013, 2013

    1461428432 / 9781461428435

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    Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, GermaniaBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.

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    Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Buchanan and Tullock's seminal work, The Calculus of Consent, linked economic methodology to substantive questions in political science. Among the major contributions of their book is a connection between constitutional decision making and contractarianism, a philosophical tradition that proponents believe can give institutions legitimacy. In other words, a major contribution of their book is a clear connection between empirical decision making and normative principles. The current book formalizes and extends their foundational ideas as it attempts to show how economic and philosophical arguments about the 'best' voting rules can be used to improve constitutional design. It informs debates about constitutional political economy in comparative politics, democratic theory, and public choice. Political scientists often ask questions about what causes a nation to seek a new constitution, how constitutions are made, and what factors allow for corrupt decision making. The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions are formed. This provides a benchmark to help create better constitutions and informs empirical research about what institutions are most likely to succeed. The book begins by showing how contractarian ideals can be used to justify choices about decision-making. It then carefully defines several concepts employed by Buchanan and Tullock and shows why the relationships between these concepts may not be as closely linked as Buchanan and Tullock first thought. This provides a backdrop for analyzing the three phases of constitutional decision-making: 1) the constitutional phase, where rules for constitutional decision making must be justified; 2) the legislative phase, where the optimal k-majority rule is analyzed; and 3) the electoral phase, where the optimal voting rule for large electorates and open alternatives are determined. These phases differ by context and sources of legitimacy. Computational models and analytic techniques are introduced in each of these chapters. Finally, the book concludes with statements about the significance of the research for the creation of constitutions more broadly. 132 pp. Englisch.…

  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer New York, 2013

    1461428432 / 9781461428435

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    Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Illustrates how computer based models can help us better understand political science and how they can be used to extend rational choice theoryConnects normative theories of how to make better constitutions with the empirical theories of which con.…

  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer, 2013

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    Da: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Regno UnitoMajestic Books

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    Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 132 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.

  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer New York, Springer New York Apr 2013, 2013

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    Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germaniabuchversandmimpf2000

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    Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Buchanan and Tullock¿s seminal work, The Calculus of Consent, linked economic methodology to substantive questions in political science. Among the major contributions of their book is a connection between constitutional decision making and contractarianism, a philosophical tradition that proponents believe can give institutions legitimacy. In other words, a major contribution of their book is a clear connection between empirical decision making and normative principles. The currentbook formalizes and extends their foundationalideas as it attempts to show how economic and philosophical arguments about the 'best' voting rules can be used to improve constitutional design. It informs debates about constitutional political economy in comparative politics, democratic theory, and public choice. Political scientists often ask questions about what causes a nation to seek a new constitution, how constitutions are made, and what factors allow for corrupt decision making. The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design bridges the gap between normative questions about which institutions are most efficient and fair and empirical questions about how constitutions are formed. This provides a benchmark to help create better constitutions and informs empirical research about what institutions are most likely to succeed.The book begins by showing how contractarian ideals can be used to justify choices about decision-making. It then carefully defines several concepts employed by Buchanan and Tullock and shows why the relationships between these concepts may not be as closely linked as Buchanan and Tullock first thought. This provides a backdrop for analyzing the three phases of constitutional decision-making: 1) the constitutional phase, where rules for constitutional decision making must be justified; 2) the legislative phase, where the optimal k-majority rule is analyzed; and 3) the electoral phase, where the optimal voting rule for largeelectorates and open alternatives are determined. These phases differ by context and sources of legitimacy. Computational models and analytic techniques are introduced in each of these chapters. Finally, the book concludes with statements about the significance of the research for the creation of constitutions more broadly.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 132 pp. Englisch.…

  • Lingua: Inglese

    Editore: Springer, 2013

    1461428432 / 9781461428435

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    Da: Biblios, frankfurt am main, HESSE, GermaniaBiblios

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    Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 132.