ISBN: 9781575863924 - logic, convention, and common knowledge: a conventionalist account of logic (17 risultati)

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Paperback. Condizione: New. One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of events - a revisiting of Lewis's Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray's classic coordination problem wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means.…

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 1st edition. 166 pages. 9.15x6.25x0.30 inches. In Stock.

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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of events--a revisiting of Lewis's Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray's classic coordination problem, wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means.…

Condizione: New. &Uumlber den AutorPaul F. Syverson is a mathematician at the Center for High Assurance Computer Systems within the Naval Research Laboratory.

Paperback. Condizione: New. One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of events - a revisiting of Lewis's Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray's classic coordination problem wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means.…

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