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Paperback. Condizione: Very Good.
Paperback. Condizione: Good.
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Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. This book is in very good condition; no remainder marks. It does have some cover shelfwear and corner wear. Inside pages are clean. ; 6.2 X 0.5 X 9.1 inches; 224 pages.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Fonthill Media Ltd, Toadsmoor Road, 2012
ISBN 10: 1781550069 ISBN 13: 9781781550069
Da: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, U.S.A.
Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. "The Luftwaffe - the German Air Force - will no longer have a decisive influence on the outcome of World War II, no matter how long it takes to beat Hitler." It is more than two years since I first heard these words. The man who spoke them to me continued: "No doubt, we will hear of the Luftwaffe before the war is over. We will hear a lot. But don't let us be deceived. No matter what happens, the Luftwaffe can never be used as a strategic first-line weapon within the Nazi plan. It can play no role but that of a tactical and auxiliary weapon." Curt Reiss, December 1943. Can it really be true that in 1941 insiders knew the Luftwaffe was a spent force; and a failed organization? This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe - pushed by the Nazi Party - to adopt a policy that left it hopelessly stretched and exposed. Little known facts shine out - such as the policy of failing to produce spares led the Luftwaffe to lose 2,500 aircraft during the invasion of Poland alone. The regime designed the Luftwaffe for Blitzkrieg, and Blitzkrieg alone. When a long-haul set in on an eastern front, on an African front and later on a western front, the collapse of Germany became simply inevitable. Crammed full of fascinating detail, and displaying much prescience, this book leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the much-vaunted German efficiency suffered from the dead-hand of the Nazi Party with its corruption and its contradictions. The insights into Goering and his wholesale thefts to fund a lavish life-style add colour to the picture of his incompetence. This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how Nazi incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe to adopt a policy whereby it was doomed to fail. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: New. *Brand new* Ships from USA.
EUR 21,46
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: New. "The Luftwaffe - the German Air Force - will no longer have a decisive influence on the outcome of World War II, no matter how long it takes to beat Hitler." It is more than two years since I first heard these words. The man who spoke them to me continued: "No doubt, we will hear of the Luftwaffe before the war is over. We will hear a lot. But don't let us be deceived. No matter what happens, the Luftwaffe can never be used as a strategic first-line weapon within the Nazi plan. It can play no role but that of a tactical and auxiliary weapon." Curt Reiss, December 1943. Can it really be true that in 1941 insiders knew the Luftwaffe was a spent force; and a failed organization? This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe - pushed by the Nazi Party - to adopt a policy that left it hopelessly stretched and exposed. Little known facts shine out - such as the policy of failing to produce spares led the Luftwaffe to lose 2,500 aircraft during the invasion of Poland alone.The regime designed the Luftwaffe for Blitzkrieg, and Blitzkrieg alone. When a long-haul set in on an eastern front, on an African front and later on a western front, the collapse of Germany became simply inevitable. Crammed full of fascinating detail, and displaying much prescience, this book leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the much-vaunted German efficiency suffered from the dead-hand of the Nazi Party with its corruption and its contradictions. The insights into Goering and his wholesale thefts to fund a lavish life-style add colour to the picture of his incompetence.
EUR 26,11
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: New. "The Luftwaffe - the German Air Force - will no longer have a decisive influence on the outcome of World War II, no matter how long it takes to beat Hitler." It is more than two years since I first heard these words. The man who spoke them to me continued: "No doubt, we will hear of the Luftwaffe before the war is over. We will hear a lot. But don't let us be deceived. No matter what happens, the Luftwaffe can never be used as a strategic first-line weapon within the Nazi plan. It can play no role but that of a tactical and auxiliary weapon." Curt Reiss, December 1943. Can it really be true that in 1941 insiders knew the Luftwaffe was a spent force; and a failed organization? This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe - pushed by the Nazi Party - to adopt a policy that left it hopelessly stretched and exposed. Little known facts shine out - such as the policy of failing to produce spares led the Luftwaffe to lose 2,500 aircraft during the invasion of Poland alone.The regime designed the Luftwaffe for Blitzkrieg, and Blitzkrieg alone. When a long-haul set in on an eastern front, on an African front and later on a western front, the collapse of Germany became simply inevitable. Crammed full of fascinating detail, and displaying much prescience, this book leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the much-vaunted German efficiency suffered from the dead-hand of the Nazi Party with its corruption and its contradictions. The insights into Goering and his wholesale thefts to fund a lavish life-style add colour to the picture of his incompetence.
EUR 8,92
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: Very Good.
EUR 18,27
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. 2012. Paperback. This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how Nazi incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe to adopt a policy whereby it was doomed to fail. Num Pages: 224 pages, 85 black and white photographs. BIC Classification: 1DFG; HBWQ; JWG. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 235 x 165 x 15. Weight in Grams: 500. . . . . .
EUR 21,80
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. 2012. Paperback. This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how Nazi incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe to adopt a policy whereby it was doomed to fail. Num Pages: 224 pages, 85 black and white photographs. BIC Classification: 1DFG; HBWQ; JWG. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 235 x 165 x 15. Weight in Grams: 500. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
EUR 29,11
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: Brand New. 240 pages. 9.13x0.55x6.14 inches. In Stock.
EUR 10,96
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Aggiungi al carrellopaperback. Condizione: New.
EUR 23,04
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: New. "The Luftwaffe - the German Air Force - will no longer have a decisive influence on the outcome of World War II, no matter how long it takes to beat Hitler." It is more than two years since I first heard these words. The man who spoke them to me continued: "No doubt, we will hear of the Luftwaffe before the war is over. We will hear a lot. But don't let us be deceived. No matter what happens, the Luftwaffe can never be used as a strategic first-line weapon within the Nazi plan. It can play no role but that of a tactical and auxiliary weapon." Curt Reiss, December 1943. Can it really be true that in 1941 insiders knew the Luftwaffe was a spent force; and a failed organization? This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe - pushed by the Nazi Party - to adopt a policy that left it hopelessly stretched and exposed. Little known facts shine out - such as the policy of failing to produce spares led the Luftwaffe to lose 2,500 aircraft during the invasion of Poland alone.The regime designed the Luftwaffe for Blitzkrieg, and Blitzkrieg alone. When a long-haul set in on an eastern front, on an African front and later on a western front, the collapse of Germany became simply inevitable. Crammed full of fascinating detail, and displaying much prescience, this book leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the much-vaunted German efficiency suffered from the dead-hand of the Nazi Party with its corruption and its contradictions. The insights into Goering and his wholesale thefts to fund a lavish life-style add colour to the picture of his incompetence.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Fonthill Media Ltd, Toadsmoor Road, 2012
ISBN 10: 1781550069 ISBN 13: 9781781550069
Da: AussieBookSeller, Truganina, VIC, Australia
EUR 37,24
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. "The Luftwaffe - the German Air Force - will no longer have a decisive influence on the outcome of World War II, no matter how long it takes to beat Hitler." It is more than two years since I first heard these words. The man who spoke them to me continued: "No doubt, we will hear of the Luftwaffe before the war is over. We will hear a lot. But don't let us be deceived. No matter what happens, the Luftwaffe can never be used as a strategic first-line weapon within the Nazi plan. It can play no role but that of a tactical and auxiliary weapon." Curt Reiss, December 1943. Can it really be true that in 1941 insiders knew the Luftwaffe was a spent force; and a failed organization? This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe - pushed by the Nazi Party - to adopt a policy that left it hopelessly stretched and exposed. Little known facts shine out - such as the policy of failing to produce spares led the Luftwaffe to lose 2,500 aircraft during the invasion of Poland alone. The regime designed the Luftwaffe for Blitzkrieg, and Blitzkrieg alone. When a long-haul set in on an eastern front, on an African front and later on a western front, the collapse of Germany became simply inevitable. Crammed full of fascinating detail, and displaying much prescience, this book leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the much-vaunted German efficiency suffered from the dead-hand of the Nazi Party with its corruption and its contradictions. The insights into Goering and his wholesale thefts to fund a lavish life-style add colour to the picture of his incompetence. This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how Nazi incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe to adopt a policy whereby it was doomed to fail. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.
EUR 27,10
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how Nazi incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe to adopt a policy whereby it was doomed to fail.
EUR 23,36
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: New. "The Luftwaffe - the German Air Force - will no longer have a decisive influence on the outcome of World War II, no matter how long it takes to beat Hitler." It is more than two years since I first heard these words. The man who spoke them to me continued: "No doubt, we will hear of the Luftwaffe before the war is over. We will hear a lot. But don't let us be deceived. No matter what happens, the Luftwaffe can never be used as a strategic first-line weapon within the Nazi plan. It can play no role but that of a tactical and auxiliary weapon." Curt Reiss, December 1943. Can it really be true that in 1941 insiders knew the Luftwaffe was a spent force; and a failed organization? This remarkable, but little-known book was written in 1943 and published in 1944. It argues, with remarkable clarity how incompetence at the highest level, both in planning and strategy led the Luftwaffe - pushed by the Nazi Party - to adopt a policy that left it hopelessly stretched and exposed. Little known facts shine out - such as the policy of failing to produce spares led the Luftwaffe to lose 2,500 aircraft during the invasion of Poland alone.The regime designed the Luftwaffe for Blitzkrieg, and Blitzkrieg alone. When a long-haul set in on an eastern front, on an African front and later on a western front, the collapse of Germany became simply inevitable. Crammed full of fascinating detail, and displaying much prescience, this book leaves the reader with the distinct impression that the much-vaunted German efficiency suffered from the dead-hand of the Nazi Party with its corruption and its contradictions. The insights into Goering and his wholesale thefts to fund a lavish life-style add colour to the picture of his incompetence.