Isbn: 9783031004490 - game theory for data science: eliciting truthful information (17 risultati)

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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards.We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading.…

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Game Theory for Data Science | Eliciting Truthful Information | Boi Faltings (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning | xv | Englisch | 2017 | Springer | EAN 9783031004490 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.…

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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards.We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading. 152 pp. Englisch.…

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Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it be.…

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards.We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 152 pp. Englisch.…