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Da: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Regno Unito
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Da: Chiron Media, Wallingford, Regno Unito
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Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno Unito
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Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Springer International Publishing, 2017
ISBN 10: 3031004493 ISBN 13: 9783031004490
Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germania
EUR 53,49
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Aggiungi al carrelloTaschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards.We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading.
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Aggiungi al carrelloTaschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Game Theory for Data Science | Eliciting Truthful Information | Boi Faltings (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning | xv | Englisch | 2017 | Springer | EAN 9783031004490 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.
Da: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italia
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Da: Basi6 International, Irving, TX, U.S.A.
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Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Springer International Publishing Sep 2017, 2017
ISBN 10: 3031004493 ISBN 13: 9783031004490
Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germania
EUR 53,49
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Aggiungi al carrelloTaschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards.We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading. 152 pp. Englisch.
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Da: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Germania
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Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Springer, Berlin|Springer International Publishing|Morgan & Claypool|Springer, 2017
ISBN 10: 3031004493 ISBN 13: 9783031004490
Da: moluna, Greven, Germania
EUR 47,23
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it be.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Springer, Springer Sep 2017, 2017
ISBN 10: 3031004493 ISBN 13: 9783031004490
Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germania
EUR 53,49
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloTaschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards.We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 152 pp. Englisch.