9783662004135 - power, voting, and voting power (9 risultati)
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Da: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Regno UnitoRia Christie Collections
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Da: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, IrlandaKennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd.
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Condizione: New. Editor(s): Holler, Manfred Joseph. Num Pages: 332 pages, biography. BIC Classification: JPA; KFFD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 244 x 170 x 18. Weight in Grams: 594. . 2012. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1982. Paperback. . . . .
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Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno UnitoRevaluation Books
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Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. reprint edition. 344 pages. 9.60x6.60x0.90 inches. In Stock.
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Da: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, U.S.A.Kennys Bookstore
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Condizione: New. Editor(s): Holler, Manfred Joseph. Num Pages: 332 pages, biography. BIC Classification: JPA; KFFD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 244 x 170 x 18. Weight in Grams: 594. . 2012. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1982. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
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Da: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, ItaliaBrook Bookstore On Demand
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Condizione: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.
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Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, GermaniaBuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K.
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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Any normative theory of democracy involves notions of equity, which are supposed to guide collective decisions. On the other hand, a descriptive theory of any decision-making body must take into account the distribution of power in… that body. The development of collective decision theory along two different paths reflects these two foci of interest in the theory of democracy. One direction can be subsumed under the theory of social choice, the other under the theory of games. In the theory of social choice, the participants are characterized only by their preferences among a set of alternatives (candidates, courses of action, etc. ). They do not choose among these alternatives. They only submit their preferences to some central authority ('the Society'), which then chooses among the alternatives in accordance with some fixed rule of aggregating the preferences. On the other hand, the point of departure in the theory of games is a set of actors, each of whom can choose between alternative courses of action (strategies). The totality of choices results in an outcome, which gener ally has different utilities for the different actors. In this book, both approaches are presented in selected papers, from which the reader can get an excellent overview of the state of the art. Both branches of formal decision theory, the theory of social choice and the theory of games, were developed in mathematical language, but very little technical mathematical knowledge is required to follow the arguments. 344 pp. Englisch.
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Da: moluna, Greven, Germaniamoluna
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Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Any normative theory of democracy involves notions of equity, which are supposed to guide collective decisions. On the other hand, a descriptive theory of any decision-making body must take into account the distribut…ion of power in that body. The developmen.
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Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germaniabuchversandmimpf2000
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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Any normative theory of democracy involves notions of equity, which are supposed to guide collective decisions. On the other hand, a descriptive theory of any decision-making body must take into account the distribution of power in tha…t body. The development of collective decision theory along two different paths reflects these two foci of interest in the theory of democracy. One direction can be subsumed under the theory of social choice, the other under the theory of games. In the theory of social choice, the participants are characterized only by their preferences among a set of alternatives (candidates, courses of action, etc. ). They do not choose among these alternatives. They only submit their preferences to some central authority ('the Society'), which then chooses among the alternatives in accordance with some fixed rule of aggregating the preferences. On the other hand, the point of departure in the theory of games is a set of actors, each of whom can choose between alternative courses of action (strategies). The totality of choices results in an outcome, which gener ally has different utilities for the different actors. In this book, both approaches are presented in selected papers, from which the reader can get an excellent overview of the state of the art. Both branches of formal decision theory, the theory of social choice and the theory of games, were developed in mathematical language, but very little technical mathematical knowledge is required to follow the arguments.Physica Verlag, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 344 pp. Englisch.
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Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, GermaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Any normative theory of democracy involves notions of equity, which are supposed to guide collective decisions. On the other hand, a descriptive theory of any decision-making body must take into account the distribution of power in that… body. The development of collective decision theory along two different paths reflects these two foci of interest in the theory of democracy. One direction can be subsumed under the theory of social choice, the other under the theory of games. In the theory of social choice, the participants are characterized only by their preferences among a set of alternatives (candidates, courses of action, etc. ). They do not choose among these alternatives. They only submit their preferences to some central authority ('the Society'), which then chooses among the alternatives in accordance with some fixed rule of aggregating the preferences. On the other hand, the point of departure in the theory of games is a set of actors, each of whom can choose between alternative courses of action (strategies). The totality of choices results in an outcome, which gener ally has different utilities for the different actors. In this book, both approaches are presented in selected papers, from which the reader can get an excellent overview of the state of the art. Both branches of formal decision theory, the theory of social choice and the theory of games, were developed in mathematical language, but very little technical mathematical knowledge is required to follow the arguments.
