9789024713394 - The Mind and the Brain: A Multi-Aspect Interpretation di Ornstein, J. H. (15 risultati)

Condizione: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1972.

Trade Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. Condizione sovraccoperta: No Dust Jacket. First Edition. A Very Good copy in lightly worn paper covers. The binding is sound, the text is clean/unmarked, and not ex-library. Book.

Broschiert. Condizione: Gut. 174 Seiten; Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann entsprechende Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). Aufgrund des Alters und der häufigen Nutzung können Stabilität, Einband sowie Papierqualität beeinträchtigt sein. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 355.

Condizione: very good. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff,1972. Paperback. x,174 pp. Index. Condition : very good copy. ISBN 9789024713394. Keywords : PHILOSOPHY,

Paperback. Condizione: Good. 1st Edition. vii + 174 p. Buch.

Condizione: New. In.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. pp. ix + 174.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. reprint edition. 184 pages. 8.43x5.85x0.43 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: New.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - 2 no predictions or experimental findings based on the Identity Theory differ from those based on mind-brain Parallelism or Epiphenomenal ism, i.e., Dualism in general. The Identity Theory, therefore, must stand or fall on its reputed conceptual advantages over Dualism. Then the conceptual issues at stake in the mind-brain problem are discussed. The kernel of truth present in the Identity Theory is shown to be obscured by all the talk about reducing sensations to neural processes. An attempt is made to characterize pain adequately as a pattern or complex of bodily processes. This view is then reconciled with the asymmetry in the way one is aware of one's own pains and the way in which others are. This asymmetry constitutes an epistemological dualism which no philosophical theory or scientific experiment could alter. The sense in which experiences are both mental and physical is thus elucidated. A Multi-Aspect Theory of the mind is presented and defended. Five aspects of pain are discussed in some detail: experiential, neural, bodily, behavioral and verbal. Having a mind characteristically involves having all of these features except the bodily (i.e., a physical irregularity). Thus having a mind characteristically entails having experiences and a healthy, functioning brain. It also involves being able to act and speak reasonably intelligently.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -2 no predictions or experimental findings based on the Identity Theory differ from those based on mind-brain Parallelism or Epiphenomenal ism, i.e., Dualism in general. The Identity Theory, therefore, must stand or fall on its reputed conceptual advantages over Dualism. Then the conceptual issues at stake in the mind-brain problem are discussed. The kernel of truth present in the Identity Theory is shown to be obscured by all the talk about reducing sensations to neural processes. An attempt is made to characterize pain adequately as a pattern or complex of bodily processes. This view is then reconciled with the asymmetry in the way one is aware of one's own pains and the way in which others are. This asymmetry constitutes an epistemological dualism which no philosophical theory or scientific experiment could alter. The sense in which experiences are both mental and physical is thus elucidated. A Multi-Aspect Theory of the mind is presented and defended. Five aspects of pain are discussed in some detail: experiential, neural, bodily, behavioral and verbal. Having a mind characteristically involves having all of these features except the bodily (i.e., a physical irregularity). Thus having a mind characteristically entails having experiences and a healthy, functioning brain. It also involves being able to act and speak reasonably intelligently. 188 pp. Englisch.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. ix + 174.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. ix + 174.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -2 no predictions or experimental findings based on the Identity Theory differ from those based on mind-brain Parallelism or Epiphenomenal ism, i.e., Dualism in general. The Identity Theory, therefore, must stand or fall on its reputed conceptual advantages over Dualism. Then the conceptual issues at stake in the mind-brain problem are discussed. The kernel of truth present in the Identity Theory is shown to be obscured by all the talk about reducing sensations to neural processes. An attempt is made to characterize pain adequately as a pattern or complex of bodily processes. This view is then reconciled with the asymmetry in the way one is aware of one's own pains and the way in which others are. This asymmetry constitutes an epistemological dualism which no philosophical theory or scientific experiment could alter. The sense in which experiences are both mental and physical is thus elucidated. A Multi-Aspect Theory of the mind is presented and defended. Five aspects of pain are discussed in some detail: experiential, neural, bodily, behavioral and verbal. Having a mind characteristically involves having all of these features except the bodily (i.e., a physical irregularity). Thus having a mind characteristically entails having experiences and a healthy, functioning brain. It also involves being able to act and speak reasonably intelligently.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 188 pp. Englisch.