ISBN: 9789814374583 - robust mechnism design: the role of private information and higher order beliefs: 2 (15 risultati)

Hardcover. First Edition. Octavo, viii, ix, xvii, 452 pages. In Very Good minus condition. Bound in the publisher's red and yellow cloth bearing white lettering to the spine. Boards have slight wear including faint soiling and minor edge wear. Text block has very slight wear including sparse finger marks to the edges. Previous owner's bookplate to the front pastedown. Illustrated. First edition. NOTE: Shelved in Locked Annex, Column CC. 1412043. FP New Rockville Stock.…

Condizione: New.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardback. Condizione: New. New. Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.…

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 456 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.25 inches. In Stock.

Hardback. Condizione: New. New. Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.…

Gebunden. Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation. This title brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.Inh.…

Buch. Condizione: Neu. ROBUST MECHANISM DESIGN | Bergemann Dirk | Buch | Gebunden | Englisch | 2012 | World Scientific | EAN 9789814374583 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.…