Series: t-reality – philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy - 9798248913077 - the ontological limit of reductionism: structure and limits of reductive explanation in contemporary philosophy of mind: 2 di a., kheprias (10 risultati)

Condizione: New.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - The Ontological Limit of ReductionismStructure and Limits of Reductive Explanation in Contemporary Philosophy of MindT-Reality Series - Vol. 1Ontological Domain>The Ontological Limit of Reductionism is the first volume of the T-Reality Series, an interdisciplinary investigation into consciousness at the intersection of philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Scientific reductionism has been one of the most successful explanatory frameworks in modern science. By analyzing systems in terms of their physical components and underlying mechanisms, reductionism has enabled major advances in physics, biology, and neuroscience, including the identification of neural correlates of perception, memory, cognition, and self-awareness. Yet when applied to consciousness, reductionism reaches a fundamental epistemological boundary. Contemporary philosophy of mind has demonstrated that describing neural processes does not fully explain subjective experience. This problem-known as the explanatory gap-has been explored by leading thinkers including Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Joseph Levine, Daniel Dennett, and Thomas Metzinger. This volume provides a rigorous analysis of: - scientific reductionism and its theoretical structure - the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) - self-model theory and cognitive self-representation - computational models of the mind - predictive processing and generative brain models - representation and reference in cognitive systems>Drawing on the work of David Marr, Karl Friston, Patricia Churchland, Thomas Metzinger, and Daniel Dennett, this book develops a precise conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between brain processes and conscious experience. The T-Reality series presents a systematic philosophical and scientific investigation into consciousness, grounded in contemporary neuroscience, philosophy, and cognitive science. This volume serves as the theoretical foundation of the series and is intended for readers interested in: - philosophy of mind - neuroscience and consciousness - cognitive science - neurophilosophy - consciousness studies - theoretical neuroscience.…

Condizione: New. Print on Demand.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. The Ontological Limit of ReductionismStructure and Limits of Reductive Explanation in Contemporary Philosophy of MindT-Reality Series - Vol. 1Ontological DomainPhilosophy of Mind and Neurophilosophy The Ontological Limit of Reductionism is the first volume of the T-Reality Series, an interdisciplinary investigation into consciousness at the intersection of philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Scientific reductionism has been one of the most successful explanatory frameworks in modern science. By analyzing systems in terms of their physical components and underlying mechanisms, reductionism has enabled major advances in physics, biology, and neuroscience, including the identification of neural correlates of perception, memory, cognition, and self-awareness. Yet when applied to consciousness, reductionism reaches a fundamental epistemological boundary. Contemporary philosophy of mind has demonstrated that describing neural processes does not fully explain subjective experience. This problem-known as the explanatory gap-has been explored by leading thinkers including Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Joseph Levine, Daniel Dennett, and Thomas Metzinger. This volume provides a rigorous analysis of: - scientific reductionism and its theoretical structure - the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) - self-model theory and cognitive self-representation - computational models of the mind - predictive processing and generative brain models - representation and reference in cognitive systems - the epistemological limits of neuroscientific explanation Drawing on the work of David Marr, Karl Friston, Patricia Churchland, Thomas Metzinger, and Daniel Dennett, this book develops a precise conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between brain processes and conscious experience. The T-Reality series presents a systematic philosophical and scientific investigation into consciousness, grounded in contemporary neuroscience, philosophy, and cognitive science. This volume serves as the theoretical foundation of the series and is intended for readers interested in: - philosophy of mind - neuroscience and consciousness - cognitive science - neurophilosophy - consciousness studies - theoretical neuroscience This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. The Ontological Limit of ReductionismStructure and Limits of Reductive Explanation in Contemporary Philosophy of MindT-Reality Series - Vol. 1Ontological DomainPhilosophy of Mind and Neurophilosophy The Ontological Limit of Reductionism is the first volume of the T-Reality Series, an interdisciplinary investigation into consciousness at the intersection of philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and cognitive science. Scientific reductionism has been one of the most successful explanatory frameworks in modern science. By analyzing systems in terms of their physical components and underlying mechanisms, reductionism has enabled major advances in physics, biology, and neuroscience, including the identification of neural correlates of perception, memory, cognition, and self-awareness. Yet when applied to consciousness, reductionism reaches a fundamental epistemological boundary. Contemporary philosophy of mind has demonstrated that describing neural processes does not fully explain subjective experience. This problem-known as the explanatory gap-has been explored by leading thinkers including Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Joseph Levine, Daniel Dennett, and Thomas Metzinger. This volume provides a rigorous analysis of: - scientific reductionism and its theoretical structure - the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) - self-model theory and cognitive self-representation - computational models of the mind - predictive processing and generative brain models - representation and reference in cognitive systems - the epistemological limits of neuroscientific explanation Drawing on the work of David Marr, Karl Friston, Patricia Churchland, Thomas Metzinger, and Daniel Dennett, this book develops a precise conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between brain processes and conscious experience. The T-Reality series presents a systematic philosophical and scientific investigation into consciousness, grounded in contemporary neuroscience, philosophy, and cognitive science. This volume serves as the theoretical foundation of the series and is intended for readers interested in: - philosophy of mind - neuroscience and consciousness - cognitive science - neurophilosophy - consciousness studies - theoretical neuroscience This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…