individual forecasting aggregate outcomes (26 risultati)

Broschiert. Condizione: Gut. Revised. X; 238 Seiten Der Erhaltungszustand des hier angebotenen Werks ist trotz seiner Bibliotheksnutzung sauber. Es befindet sich neben dem Rückenschild lediglich ein Bibliotheksstempel im Buch; ordnungsgemäß entwidmet. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 360.

Cloth. Condizione: Gut. 238 Seiten Guter Zustand/ Good Ex-Library. As library copy in good condition. ha1030841 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.

Hardcover. 1. publ. Ehem. Bibliotheksexemplar mit Signatur und Stempel. GUTER Zustand, ein paar Gebrauchsspuren. Ex-library with stamp and library-signature. GOOD condition, some traces of use. Hb 460 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.

Gebundene Ausgabe. Condizione: Gut. 256 Seiten Exemplar aus einer wissenchaftlichen Bibliothek Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 550.

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Hardcover. Condizione: Good. No Jacket. ix, 238 p.

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paperback. Condizione: Good. Condizione sovraccoperta: No Dust Jacket. Paperback in good condition. Light edge wear, scores and creases on covers, slightly affecting pages. Previous owner's stamp on FEP. Penned triangle on title page. Text is clear throughout. HCW. Used.

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Hardcover. Condizione: Fine. Condizione sovraccoperta: Fine. 1st Edition. ix, 238 pp. Original cloth. Some neat ink underlining on pp. 2-7, 9, else Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket. Out of print in cloth; in print in paperback at US$43.00. Edmund S. Phelps: Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2006, 'for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy.' 'Last but not least, positing rational expectations equilibrium is not just inaccurate as a way to close the model in the same sense as postulating rational choice is taken to be inaccurate: It is inappropriate to impose on the model. In a highly innovative economy and thus one subject to change, firms even firms in the same industry and location are all thinking differently. So a firm would have no grounds to reason, as it implicitly does in rational-expectations theory, that 'since I have calculated I must raise my wages by x percent, I should now take into account that my competitors are planning to do the same; so I must now adjust my wage increase even more .' This kind of inductive reasoning to arrive at the right expectations is inapplicable. That is the thesis of my piece (Phelps, 1983) in the Frydman-Phelps volume [offered here]' (Phelps, 'Macroeconomics for a Modern Economy', Nobel Lecture, Dec. 8, 2006). Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps; 2. The trouble with 'rational expectations' and the problem of inflation stabilization Edmund S. Phelps; Comment Phillip Cagan; 3. Expectations of others' expectations and the transitional nonneutrality of fully believed systematic monetary policy Juan Carlos Di Tata; Comment Clive Bull; 4. The stability of rational expectations in macroeconomic models George Evans; Comment Guillermo A. Calvo; 5. Individual rationality, decentralization, and the rational expectations hypothesis Roman Frydman; 6. Convergence to rational expectations equilibrium Margaret Bray; Comment Roy Radner; 7. A distinction between the unconditional expectational equilibrium and the rational expectations equilibrium Roman Frydman; 8. On mistaken beliefs and resultant equilibria Alan Kirman; Comment Jerry Green; 9. Equilibrium theory with learning and disparate expectations: some issues and methods Robert M. Townsend; Comment John B. Taylor; 10. Keynesianism, monetarism, and rational expectations: some reflections and conjectures Axel Leijonhufvud; Comment Frank Hahn; Index.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Growing out of a conference on Expectations Formation and Economic Disequilibrium held in New York City in 1981, the papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy. The papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Growing out of a conference on Expectations Formation and Economic Disequilibrium held in New York City in 1981, the papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy.

Hardcover. Condizione: Fine. Condizione sovraccoperta: Fine. 1st Edition. ix, 238 pp. Original cloth. Signature of former owner on front flyleaf, else Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket. Out of print in cloth; in print in paperback at US$43.00. Edmund S. Phelps: Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2006, 'for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy.' 'Last but not least, positing rational expectations equilibrium is not just inaccurate as a way to close the model in the same sense as postulating rational choice is taken to be inaccurate: It is inappropriate to impose on the model. In a highly innovative economy and thus one subject to change, firms even firms in the same industry and location are all thinking differently. So a firm would have no grounds to reason, as it implicitly does in rational-expectations theory, that 'since I have calculated I must raise my wages by x percent, I should now take into account that my competitors are planning to do the same; so I must now adjust my wage increase even more .' This kind of inductive reasoning to arrive at the right expectations is inapplicable. That is the thesis of my piece (Phelps, 1983) in the Frydman-Phelps volume [offered here]' (Phelps, 'Macroeconomics for a Modern Economy', Nobel Lecture, Dec. 8, 2006). Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps; 2. The trouble with 'rational expectations' and the problem of inflation stabilization Edmund S. Phelps; Comment Phillip Cagan; 3. Expectations of others' expectations and the transitional nonneutrality of fully believed systematic monetary policy Juan Carlos Di Tata; Comment Clive Bull; 4. The stability of rational expectations in macroeconomic models George Evans; Comment Guillermo A. Calvo; 5. Individual rationality, decentralization, and the rational expectations hypothesis Roman Frydman; 6. Convergence to rational expectations equilibrium Margaret Bray; Comment Roy Radner; 7. A distinction between the unconditional expectational equilibrium and the rational expectations equilibrium Roman Frydman; 8. On mistaken beliefs and resultant equilibria Alan Kirman; Comment Jerry Green; 9. Equilibrium theory with learning and disparate expectations: some issues and methods Robert M. Townsend; Comment John B. Taylor; 10. Keynesianism, monetarism, and rational expectations: some reflections and conjectures Axel Leijonhufvud; Comment Frank Hahn; Index.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Growing out of a conference on Expectations Formation and Economic Disequilibrium held in New York City in 1981, the papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy. The papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: New.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Growing out of a conference on Expectations Formation and Economic Disequilibrium held in New York City in 1981, the papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy. The papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the 'correct' model and the equilibrium coordination of agents' plans. They reject the 'optimality' argument for the rational expectations hypothesis, opening the door to other hypotheses of optimal expectations of agents in the decentralized market economy. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. reprint edition. 256 pages. 8.82x5.98x0.71 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days 400.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The papers in this volume provide a complex view of market processes in which individual rationality is no guarantee of convergence to the correct model and the equilibrium coordination of agents plans. They reject the optimality argument for the ratio.