This paper examines the implications of anti-drug policies in two types of countries: drug consumers and producers. Based on empirical information of consumer and producer countries and an examination of policy approaches, the analysis depicts an original game where actors are able to find cooperative equilibrium in their strategies under the logic of interdependence. Assuming one country is willing to influence another's policy, the model concludes symmetric decisions might reduce the size of the illegal market reaching a Cournot - Nash equilibrium. The resultant equilibrium implies that both countries share responsibility in defining anti- drug policies and that it is possible to find an optimal budget share devoted to financing said policies. The paper also explores policy dynamics of countries with power, their ability to influence anti-drug policy agendas, and their effect on curbing illegal drug production and consumption trends.
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Colombian economist. He has worked in public institutions and international organizations as advisor and consultant in public policy topics, anti drug policies, alternative development and rural development policies .
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Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This paper examines the implications of anti-drug policies in two types of countries: drug consumers and producers. Based on empirical information of consumer and producer countries and an examination of policy approaches, the analysis depicts an original game where actors are able to find cooperative equilibrium in their strategies under the logic of interdependence. Assuming one country is willing to influence another's policy, the model concludes symmetric decisions might reduce the size of the illegal market reaching a Cournot - Nash equilibrium. The resultant equilibrium implies that both countries share responsibility in defining anti- drug policies and that it is possible to find an optimal budget share devoted to financing said policies. The paper also explores policy dynamics of countries with power, their ability to influence anti-drug policy agendas, and their effect on curbing illegal drug production and consumption trends. 92 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9783843380188
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Da: moluna, Greven, Germania
Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Autor/Autorin: Vargas Manrique Carlos EduardoColombian economist. He has worked in public institutions and international organizations as advisor and consultant in public policy topics, anti drug policies, alternative development and rural deve. Codice articolo 5467875
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Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 92 pages. 8.66x5.91x0.21 inches. In Stock. Codice articolo __384338018X
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Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 92 pages. 8.66x5.91x0.21 inches. In Stock. Codice articolo 384338018X
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Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware -This paper examines the implications of anti-drug policies in two types of countries: drug consumers and producers. Based on empirical information of consumer and producer countries and an examination of policy approaches, the analysis depicts an original game where actors are able to find cooperative equilibrium in their strategies under the logic of interdependence. Assuming one country is willing to influence another''s policy, the model concludes symmetric decisions might reduce the size of the illegal market reaching a Cournot - Nash equilibrium. The resultant equilibrium implies that both countries share responsibility in defining anti- drug policies and that it is possible to find an optimal budget share devoted to financing said policies. The paper also explores policy dynamics of countries with power, their ability to influence anti-drug policy agendas, and their effect on curbing illegal drug production and consumption trends.Books on Demand GmbH, Überseering 33, 22297 Hamburg 92 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9783843380188
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Da: preigu, Osnabrück, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. INTERNATIONAL ANTI-DRUGS POLICIES, COOPERATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE | A GAME THEORY'S APPROACH | Carlos Eduardo Vargas Manrique | Taschenbuch | 92 S. | Englisch | 2010 | LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing | EAN 9783843380188 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: BoD - Books on Demand, In de Tarpen 42, 22848 Norderstedt, info[at]bod[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu. Codice articolo 107180839
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Da: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, Regno Unito
paperback. Condizione: New. NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book. Codice articolo ERICA829384338018X6
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