ISBN 10: 9058922545 ISBN 13: 9789058922540
Da: Kloof Booksellers & Scientia Verlag, Amsterdam, Paesi Bassi
EUR 22,95
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: very good. Rotterdam : Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2010. Paperback. xvi,180 pp. ill. ; 24 cm. English text. Thesis Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. (ERIM Ph.D. series research in management ; 209). - Central bank communication has increasingly been emphasized as crucial for effective monetary policy, yet this very emphasis makes speaking more difficult. This study examines how central bank presidents communicate in both normal and crisis times. It shows that the ideal of transparency, often presented as essential, is largely an illusion: policymakers and academics disagree on its meaning, and so-called transparent communication is typically staged, ritualized, and constrained by strict rules. Using a Foucauldian perspective, the research uncovers the underlying rules governing central bank discourse, demonstrating that communication is a strategic game whose outcome depends on interactions among multiple players. A media analysis reveals that presidents speak more during crises but remain only one voice among many competing actors. Crisis situations disrupt normal rules, forcing presidents to redefine the communicative game and reconstruct authority. The study concludes that central bank presidents must engage multiple publics and distribute power through communication to remain effective. The study is particularly relevant in the context of the post-2008 financial crisis, where central bank transparency became pivotal for economic stability and public confidence. Condition : very good copy. ISBN 9789058922540. Keywords : ECONOMICS, monetary economics philosophy of language Foucault, Michel (1926-1984).