Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.
Le informazioni nella sezione "Riassunto" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.
Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.
Le informazioni nella sezione "Su questo libro" possono far riferimento a edizioni diverse di questo titolo.
Da: moluna, Greven, Germania
Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today s socially insured. . Codice articolo 5831851
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Da: preigu, Osnabrück, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Bonus Options in Health Insurance | Peter Zweifel | Taschenbuch | Einband - flex.(Paperback) | Englisch | 2012 | Springer Netherland | EAN 9789401051170 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer-Verlag GmbH, Europaplatz 3, 69115 Heidelberg, productsafety[at]springernature[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand. Codice articolo 105459738
Quantità: 5 disponibili
Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus On this issue, there is some surprising evidence. Codice articolo 9789401051170
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 156 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9789401051170
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Da: BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Germania
Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus On this issue, there is some surprising evidence. 156 pp. Englisch. Codice articolo 9789401051170
Quantità: 2 disponibili
Da: Books Puddle, Woodside, NY, U.S.A.
Condizione: New. pp. 156. Codice articolo 26127716856
Quantità: 4 disponibili
Da: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Regno Unito
Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 156 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam. Codice articolo 132870695
Quantità: 4 disponibili
Da: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Germania
Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 156. Codice articolo 18127716850
Quantità: 4 disponibili
Da: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, Regno Unito
Paperback. Condizione: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book. Codice articolo ERICA80094010511786
Quantità: 1 disponibili