Logic, Convention, and Common Knowledge (Paperback)

Paul F. Syverson

ISBN 10: 1575863928 / ISBN 13: 9781575863924

Editore: Centre for the Study of Language & Information, Stanford, 2002

Paperback. One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of eventsa revisiting of Lewis's Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray's classic coordination problem, wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means. One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of events—a revisiting of Lewis's Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray's classic coordination problem, wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. Codice articolo 9781575863924

Riassunto:

One of the fundamental theses of this book is that logical consequence and logical truth are not simply given, but arise as conventions among the users of logic. Thus Syverson explains convention within a game-theoretic framework, as a kind of equilibrium between the strategies of players in a game where they share common knowledge of events - a revisiting of Lewis's Convention that argues that convention can be reasonably treated as coordination equilibria. Most strikingly, a realistic solution is provided for Gray's classic coordination problem wherein two generals can only communicate with each other through unreliable means.

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Titolo: Logic, Convention, and Common Knowledge (...
Casa editrice: Centre for the Study of Language & Information, Stanford
Data di pubblicazione: 2002
Legatura: Paperback
Condizione: new