Reasons and Purposes : Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action

G. F. Schueler

ISBN 10: 0199250375 / ISBN 13: 9780199250370

Editore: OUP Oxford, 2003

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nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons.

Codice articolo 9780199250370

Dati bibliografici

• Titolo: Reasons and Purposes : Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action
• Editore: OUP Oxford
• Data di pubblicazione: 2003
• Lingua: Inglese
• ISBN 10: 0199250375
• ISBN 13: 9780199250370
• Rilegatura: Buch
• Condizione: Neu
• Dimensioni: 222 L x 145 A x 14 P (millimetri) 222 millimetri di larghezza per 145 millimetri di altezza per 14 millimetri di profondità
• Peso: 380 grammi

Descrizione articolo

Riassunto

People do things for reasons. But philosophers have disagreed sharply about how 'reasons explanations' of actions actually work and hence about their implications for human freedom and autonomy. The dominant view in contemporary philosophy is the (Humean) idea that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do.

Fred Schueler seeks to replace such causal views, arguing that they leave out two essential elements of these explanations. Reasons explanations are inherently teleological in the sense that the agent's reasons always explain the purpose for which he acted. They are also inherently normative since it is always possible that an agent's reasons for doing something are not good reasons. Schueler argues that causal accounts of reasons explanations make no sense of either of these features; he argues instead for an account based on practical deliberation, our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept.

Recensione

Schueler has offered a valuable contribution to the literature on reasons explanations of action. Reasons and Purposes is a worthwhile read for philosophers and psychologists interested in the nature and explanations of human action, as well as those working on human rationality. It presents new challenges to causalists; and it should prove to be a valuable resource for those dissatisfied with causalist proposals. (Philosophical Psychology)