T v s ramamohan rao (73 risultati)

Condizione: good. A copy that has been read, remains in good condition. All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The spine and cover show signs of wear. Pages can include notes and highlighting and show signs of wear, and the copy can include "From the library of" labels or previous owner inscriptions. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships via media mail.…

Paperback. Condizione: Good. Former library softcover in Good condition. Clean pages aside from library marks. Solid binding. Ships fast and guaranteed well protected with domestic tracking.

Hardcover. Condizione: As New. Unread and Unmarked.

235 mm x 155 mm, 0 g. XVII, 293 p. Hardcover. Versand aus Deutschland / We dispatch from Germany via Air Mail. Einband bestoßen, daher Mängelexemplar gestempelt, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Imperfect copy due to slightly bumped cover, apart from this in very good condition. Stamped. Sprache: Englisch.

Condizione: New. In English.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New. pp. xi + 227 1st Edition, Reprint.

Condizione: New. pp. 281.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 1st edition. 238 pages. 9.53x6.69x0.55 inches. In Stock.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 312 pages. 9.75x6.50x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Over the past several years there has been an awareness that mar kets, contractual arrangements, and hierarchical organizations can be uti lized as alternative modes of coordinating resource utilization in the con text of the firm. In most practical situations mixed forms of organization are more frequent. That is, non-market coordination mechanisms are being utilized even in predominantly market oriented economies. The reasons for the use of one of these organizational modes over the others are still being examined extensively. Very often, asset specificity and bilateral monopoly, risk sharing under uncertainty, transaction cost considerations, and/or technological externalities (economies of scope) have been considered as the major reasons for preferring one of these modes over the others. However, the ultimate effect on the performance of the firm, of any of these aspects which result in the adoption of any specific organizational pattern, has to be through the cost curve and/or the demand curve. The neoclassical welfare concepts, which have been developed to examine the efficiency in the functioning of markets, are well known. The sources of inefficiency in the performance of the firm under different mar ket structures are also well documented. However, there is as yet no well established set of concepts to examine the economic efficiency of the other organizational forms. It is not clear that the neoclassical welfare concepts are not relevant even under the new organizational setting. Studies of this nature are a relatively new area of economic research.…

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels.Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.…

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels.Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.…

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. pp. 244.

Condizione: New. pp. 244 52:B&W 6.14 x 9.21in or 234 x 156mm (Royal 8vo) Case Laminate on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condizione: New.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. reprint edition. 293 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.71 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Risk Sharing, Risk Spreading and Efficient Regulation | T. V. S. Ramamohan Rao | Taschenbuch | xvii | Englisch | 2016 | Springer | EAN 9788132234463 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. …

PF. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New. In English.

Paperback. Condizione: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Condizione: New. A brand new book in pristine condition. Showing zero signs of shelf wear, creases, or damage.

Condizione: New. pp. 244.

Condizione: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 312 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | The book provides an integrated approach to risk sharing, risk spreading and efficient regulation through principal agent models. It emphasizes the role of information asymmetry and risk sharing in contracts as an alternative to transaction cost considerations. It examines how contracting, as an institutional mechanism to conduct transactions, spreads risks while attempting consolidation. It further highlights the shifting emphasis in contracts from Coasian transaction cost saving to risk sharing and shows how it creates difficulties associated with risk spreading, and emphasizes the need for efficient regulation of contracts at various levels.Each of the chapters is structured using a principal agent model, and all chapters incorporate adverse selection (and exogenous randomness) as a result of information asymmetry, as well as moral hazard (and endogenous randomness) due to the self-interest-seeking behavior on the part of the participants.…

Condizione: New. In English.