Borgers tilman (24 risultati)
Lingua: Inglese
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Da: Star Canyon Books, Woodland, CA, U.S.A.Star Canyon Books
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Aggiungi al carrelloSoft cover. Condizione: Very Good. Science Direct/Elsevier. Expanded mid-size. Book is clean, with a strong spine, strong binding, no tears, and no writing, with only a small amount of handling wear. Book has approximately 500 pages, containing 16 exceptionally detailed and comprehensive abstracts from distinguished academicians… and scholars. Profusely illustrated with mathematical delineations. The average length of each monograph is approximately 30 pages. Three of the titles are as follows: 'Social Norms in Networks,' 'Stability for Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics,' 'Evolution of Preferences in Structured Populations: Genes, Guns, and Culture.' Includes references after each abstract. Securely packed in a lidded box.
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Da: Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, U.S.A.Books From California
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hardcover. Condizione: Very Good.
Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON)
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Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON)
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Da: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.GreatBookPrices
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Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON)
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Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno UnitoGreatBookPricesUK
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EUR 111,25
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Condizione: New.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Cambridge University Press CUP, 2000
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Da: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.Books Puddle
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EUR 128,80
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Condizione: New. pp. 140.
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Da: Rarewaves USA, HEBRON, KY, U.S.A.Rarewaves USA
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Hardback. Condizione: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration o…f the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
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Da: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Regno UnitoTHE SAINT BOOKSTORE
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Hardback. Condizione: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.
Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Borgers, Tilman; Krahmer, Daniel (CON); Strausz, Roland (CON)
- Rilegato
Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno UnitoGreatBookPricesUK
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Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
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Da: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Regno UnitoRarewaves.com USA
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Hardback. Condizione: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration o…f the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
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Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno UnitoRevaluation Books
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EUR 160,89
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Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 1st edition. 264 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
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Da: Rarewaves USA United, HEBRON, KY, U.S.A.Rarewaves USA United
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EUR 138,48
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Hardback. Condizione: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration o…f the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Cambridge University Press, 2000
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Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, GermaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
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EUR 125,92
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Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Arising out of the author's lifetime fascination with the links between the formal language of mathematical models and natural language, this short book comprises five essays investigating both the economics of language and the language of economics. Ari…el Rubinstein touches the structure imposed on binary relations in daily language, the evolutionary development of the meaning of words, game-theoretical considerations of pragmatics, the language of economic agents and the rhetoric of game theory. These short essays are full of challenging ideas for social scientists that should help to encourage a fundamental rethinking of many of the underlying assumptions in economic theory and game theory. As a postscript two economists, Tilman Borgers (University College London) and Bart Lipman (University of Wisconsin, Madison), and a logician, Johan van Benthem (University of Amsterdam, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation and Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information) offer comments.
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Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, GermaniaAHA-BUCH GmbH
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Buch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - What is the best way of auctioning an asset How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods How should exchanges be organized In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploratio…n of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
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Da: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Regno UnitoRarewaves.com UK
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Hardback. Condizione: New. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration o…f the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
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Da: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Regno UnitoMajestic Books
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Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 272.
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Da: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.Books Puddle
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Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 272.
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Da: Biblios, frankfurt am main, HESSE, GermaniaBiblios
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Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 272.
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Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno UnitoRevaluation Books
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Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 1st edition. 264 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.
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Da: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, U.S.A.Grand Eagle Retail
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Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Boergers addresses these questions and more through an exp…loration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makespredictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.A relatively new economic theory, mechanismdesign studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence ofdominant strategy voting mechanisms. Boergers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Cambridge University Press, 2000
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Da: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Regno UnitoMajestic Books
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Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 140 44:B&W 5.5 x 8.5 in or 216 x 140 mm (Demy 8vo) Case Laminate on Creme w/Gloss Lam.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Cambridge University Press, 2000
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Da: Biblios, frankfurt am main, HESSE, GermaniaBiblios
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EUR 136,53
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Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 140.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Cambridge University Press, 2004
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Da: moluna, Greven, Germaniamoluna
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EUR 97,69
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Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Written by one of the world s leading thinkers on game theory, this short book offers a challenging and accessible analysis of the relationship between economics and language. Essential reading for all social scienti…sts.Über den Autor.
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Da: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Regno UnitoCitiRetail
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EUR 145,40
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Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Boergers addresses these questions and more through an exp…loration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makespredictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.A relatively new economic theory, mechanismdesign studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence ofdominant strategy voting mechanisms. Boergers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.
